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Abstract. We consider a dynamic model of the capital structure of a ﬁrm with callable debt that
takes into account that equity holders and debt holders have a common interest in restructuring the
ﬁrm’s capital structure in order to avoid bankruptcy costs. Far away from the bankruptcy threat the
equity holders use the call feature of the debt to replace the existing debt in order to increase the tax
advantage to debt. When the bankruptcy threat is imminent, the equity holders propose a restructuring
of the existing debt in order to avoid bankruptcy. This proposal makes both debt holders and equity
holders better oﬀ and re-optimize the ﬁrm’s capital structure. Both the lower and upper restructuring
boundaries are derived endogenously by the equity holders’ incentive compatibility constraints. Our way
of renegotiating the debt when the bankruptcy treat is imminent is diﬀerent from the way the coupons
of the debt is renegotiated in the the strategic debt service models of, e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). In our model the entire debt (principal as well as all
future coupon rates) is restructured. It is not just the current coupon payment which is ﬁne tuned.
An important part of the debt renegotiation is to derive endogenously the value of debt and equity if
the debt restructuring proposal is rejected since this determines the relative bargaining power between
the two parties. However, since these values are oﬀ the equilibrium path, they have to be derived by an
iterative procedure.
Our model oﬀers a rational explanation for violations of the absolute priority rule. In equilibrium
the debt holders do accept a restructuring proposal from the equity holders which leaves some value to
the equity holders even though the debt holders do not get their full principal back. The reason why the
debt holders do accept such a proposal is that the alternative if they reject the equity holders’ proposal
is not necessarily an immediate liquidation of the ﬁrm. In most cases the equity holders would continue
to pay the existing coupons until the conditions become even worse before eventually withholding the
coupons and de facto forcing the ﬁrm into bankruptcy. Since the value of the debt in this alternative
situation is lower than the value the debt holders get if they accept the equity holders’ proposal, they
are willing to accept the proposal even though the equity holders also get a piece of the pie.
We also ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s objective function is fairly ﬂat over a large area so the capital structure
of the ﬁrm can vary a lot without any signiﬁcant costs or losses to the ﬁrm’s stake holders.
We investigate how ﬁrm value, equity value, debt value, par coupon rates, leverage, and yield spreads
change in a static comparative analysis. Our results show that optimal leverage is inversely related to
both growth options and earnings risk.
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1. Introduction
Most capital structure models ignore the fact that equity holders and debt holders have a common
interest in restructuring the ﬁrm’s capital structure in order to avoid bankruptcy costs when the bank-
ruptcy threat becomes imminent. The empirical evidence concerning ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress show that
most often debt holders and equity holders come to an agreement of how to restructure the ﬁrm’s capital
structure in such a way that the ﬁrm can continue operation either voluntarily before the ﬁrm enters
chapter 11 or as part of the chapter 11 process (Weiss 1990, Gilson, John, and Lang 1990, Morse and
Shaw 1988). In this paper we present a model which incorporates this type of debt renegotiations into a
dynamic capital structure model. Basically, we extend the dynamic capital structure model of Goldstein,
Ju, and Leland (2001) to include debt renegotiations at the lower boundary. In our model the capital
structure of the ﬁrm is re-optimized whenever a lower boundary is hit, and the existing debt and equity
holders negotiate how to split the ﬁrm value between them. Hence, in our model the ﬁrm is in fact never
liquidated as opposed to the Goldstein-Ju-Leland model where the ﬁrm is liquidated deﬁnitively the ﬁrst
time the lower boundary is hit. We ﬁnd that by introducing debt renegotiations the tax advantage to
debt is signiﬁcantly increased and that, in equilibrium, the debt holders rationally accept deviations from
the absolute priority rule. In addition, we ﬁnd that the optimal leverage is inversely related to both the
the growth of the ﬁrm’s earnings and its risk.
Our model falls in the category of structural credit risk models, where all relevant data of the ﬁrm are
common knowledge to all investors. In this type of model there are no asymmetric information issues
or agency problems. The interior optimal solution for the capital structure comes from counterbalancing
tax advantages to debt with debt restructuring costs and costs of ﬁnancial distress. We work with a very
simple capital structure consisting of equity and a single class of callable perpetual debt.
The model is set up as a dynamic capital structure model with earnings before interest and tax
payments (EBIT) as the only governing state variable. When EBIT hits an upper boundary, the capital
structure of the ﬁrm is re-optimized. This is implemented by calling the current outstanding debt and
issuing new debt with higher principal and coupon. When EBIT hits a lower boundary, the capital
structure of the ﬁrm is also re-optimized. This is implemented by canceling all existing debt and equity
in the ﬁrm and issuing new debt and equity so that the optimal capital structure is reestablished. The
old debt and equity holders negotiate how to split the proceeds from issuing the new debt and equity
between them. Both the lower and upper boundaries are determined by the equity holders’ incentive
constraints. Hence, it is common knowledge that the equity holders are the ones who determine when
to call the debt and when to renegotiate the debt. Since the call feature of the debt is explicitly stated
in the debt contract, the debt holders have no legal right to refuse to get the principal of the debt back
(plus possibly a call premium) and forgo all future coupon payments (at the upper boundary). However,
during the debt renegotiation phase (at the lower boundary) the debt holders have the right to reject any
restructuring proposals from the equity holders. If the restructuring proposal from the equity holders is
rejected by the debt holders, the equity holders face two alternatives: (i) they can continue to service the
debt by paying the original coupons and possibly make a new restructuring proposal later on or (ii) they
can withhold the coupons, which forces the debt holders to declare the ﬁrm bankrupt. Hence, it makes
no sense for the equity holders to make a debt restructuring proposal unless they know that it will be
accepted by the debt holders. The delicate issue here is to ﬁgure out what the optimal alternative for
the equity holders would be if the debt holders reject the proposal and what the corresponding values
of debt and equity are. The problem is that these values are oﬀ the equilibrium path and, therefore,
not derived as part of the solution. We will, however, propose an iterative procedure that can extract
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these oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path debt and equity values.1 The equity holders’ restructuring proposal is
constructed such that both debt and equity holders get the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values they would
have had if the debt holders had rejected the proposal. In addition, the proceeds (excess of the sum of the
oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity) from issuing new debt and equity are split between
the existing debt and equity holders with a fraction γ to the equity holders and the rest to the debt
holders.2 Obviously, this debt restructuring proposal will never be rejected by the debt holders. Between
the points in time when the capital structure of the ﬁrm is re-optimized, the capital structure of the ﬁrm
will vary as the realized earnings of the ﬁrm ﬂuctuate stochastically and thereby change the value of debt
and equity. Hence, the ﬁrm can change credit rating class both down and up in the time period from one
capital structure re-optimization date to the next re-optimization date. However, the capital structure
(i.e., the fraction of debt and equity) that the ﬁrm re-optimize to at each re-optimization date (i.e., at
the date when one of the boundaries is hit) is always the same, since the model is stationary. The speciﬁc
characteristics of the ﬁrm determine the optimal initial capital structure that the ﬁrm always returns
to at each re-optimization date and the boundaries that trigger the dates of when the capital structure
is re-optimized. We will see how all the parameters of the ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence these decision
variables.
As it is the case with the other dynamic capital structure models we are aware of (Kane, Marcus, and
McDonald 1985, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 1989a, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 2001), our model has a
very useful scaling property basically saying that if we have solved our model with EBIT initiated at the
level one, we can just re-scale all the results to get the solution for other initial EBIT values. Whenever
one of the boundaries is hit, the ﬁrm’s capital structure is re-optimized. Hence, the scaling property gives
that (besides the scaling factor) everything repeats itself whenever one of the boundaries is hit. This
feature of our model makes it tractable to solve the model all though numerical solution methods are
necessary. Especially ﬁnding the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values is somewhat numerically demanding.
We are not the ﬁrst to consider the problems related to the debt and equity holders’ incentive to
avoid paying the bankruptcy costs when the threat of bankruptcy becomes imminent. Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) were the ﬁrst to look at what has later been
termed strategic debt service. In these models the objective is, for each coupon paying date, to ﬁnd
the following two coupon payment levels: (i) the lowest coupon payment the debt holders would accept
from the equity holders and still not declare the ﬁrm bankrupt when the equity holders possess all the
bargaining power and also (ii) the highest coupon payment the equity holders would accept to pay to the
debt holders instead of not paying any coupon at all and face a bankruptcy call when the debt holders
have all the bargaining power. However, in these types of models the ﬁrm’s capital structure is never
re-optimized in a truly dynamic sense. A period of ﬁnancial distress is likely followed by another period
of ﬁnancial distress. When ﬁrms enter ﬁnancial distress, the outcome is often an agreement about a total
restructuring of the capital structure, not just an agreement about reducing the coupon payment of this
period (or the next period). We model a game of debt renegotiation where both principal and coupon
of the existing debt is renegotiated as a consequence of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress situation in order
to reestablish the ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure. This eﬀectively brings the ﬁrm out of the ﬁnancial
distress situation and avoids the threatening bankruptcy costs.
To illustrate this key point of our paper in a discrete setting, consider the following trinomial model
of a ﬁrm’s earnings process:
1This iterative procedure gives a solution to the bargaining game which is similar in spirit to the ﬁnite number of sequential
oﬀers reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria in the Rubinstein bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982, Rubinstein 1987).
2This simple split mimics a reduced form version of the standard Nash bargaining game solution concept.
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These numbers are the per period earnings from the ﬁrm. We assume that the process continues in
a multiplicative way each period in such a way that if, e.g., earnings of 20 are realized after the ﬁrst
period, the possible earnings in the succeeding period are 40, 16, and 8 and so on. We assume that
the total value of the optimally levered ﬁrm is 100 at date zero when the earnings are 10 and that the
optimal initial capital structure is 50% callable debt with a per period total coupon of 5 and 50% equity.
That is, the initial value of the debt is 50 and the initial value of the equity is also 50.3 If the earnings
increase to 20 after the ﬁrst period it is optimal to call the outstanding debt and to issue new debt in
order to re-optimize the ﬁrm’s capital structure. Because of the multiplicative structure of the model the
new optimal capital structure will again be a leverage of 50% and the total coupon will be 10. If the
earnings decrease to 4 after the ﬁrst period the equity holders optimally withhold paying the coupons. In
this case the debt holders take over the ﬁrm, i.e. the earnings generating process. Again because of the
multiplicative structure of the model, the ﬁrm has a value of 40 after the debt holders have re-optimized
its capital structure. Hence, de-facto debt holders receive 40 minus the bankruptcy costs. If the earnings
decrease to 8 after the ﬁrst period we assume that the equity holders continue to pay the coupons of 5 to
the debt holders. Again because of the multiplicative structure of the model the ﬁrm’s assets would have
had a value of 80, if the ﬁrm’s capital structure was optimal, i.e., a total coupon of 4 and a leverage of
50%. However, because of the higher than optimal coupons, the debt would be slightly more valuable and
the equity would be less valuable. To pick some round numbers we assume that the debt has a value of
45 and the equity has a value of 32. In this case the equity holders could re-optimize the capital structure
of the ﬁrm by retiring 20% of the outstanding debt. However, they would have to pay the debt holders
10 in order to do so.4 This would increase the total ﬁrm value from 77 to 80. The coupons would be
reduced to 4 and the capital structure would be back to the optimal 50% leverage. However, it would
not be optimal for the equity holders to retire the old debt because they would have to pay 10 to get a
value increase of 8. This is the same argument as in Leland (1994, Section VIII). Hence, in this case the
capital structure will remain in-optimal and await further changes in the earnings. This is the standard
dynamic capital structure story (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 1989a, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 2001).
Introducing strategic debt service in our example would change the equity holders behavior in the
case where the earnings are reduced to 8 after the ﬁrst period. If we assume that the bankruptcy costs
are 50% the equity holders could reduce the coupon payments to below 4 without risking that the debt
holders would declare the ﬁrm bankrupt. If the debt holders did declare bankruptcy they would only
receive 40 after the bankruptcy costs have been paid. 40 is also the value of newly issued debt with a
3For this illustrative example we have picked some nice round numbers for the ﬁrm value, the optimal capital structure, and
the optimal coupon size of the debt. However, by selecting the four values for the riskless interest rate, the call premium
of the debt, and the risk-neutral probabilities of the diﬀerent future states of the model in the right way it should be clear
that these numbers can be justiﬁed.
4Imagine that the debt has been issued as ﬁve bonds each with a coupon of one and that each bond is hold by a separate
individual. If the equity holders oﬀer anything less than 10 to any of the individual debt holders, even though the current
market price is only 9, they would not sell, since the debt holders know that by holding on to their bond it would increase
to a value of 10 as soon as the capital structure is re-optimized, which would happen as soon as one of the ﬁve outstanding
bonds are retired.
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coupon of 4 when the earnings is 8. But the debt holder’s original claim is worth more than 40 since it
still has a higher principal and a higher contract coupon. Hence, the debt holders would still be better
oﬀ by not declaring bankruptcy if the equity holders reduced the coupon to 4. This is the strategic debt
service story (Anderson and Sundaresan 1996, Mella-Barral and Perraudin 1997).
Alternatively, the capital structure of the ﬁrm could be re-optimized permanently, which we believe
is much more common in the real world than period-by-period coupon squeezing. The value of the ﬁrm
with a re-optimized capital structure is 80 and hence debt and equity holders do have a common interest
in re-optimizing the capital structure. The question, however, is how the debt and equity holders should
split this value. Inspired by the strategic debt service models one could argue that by threatening to
withhold the coupons, the equity holders can get away with only paying the debt holders 40 and keeping
the rest of the 80 for themselves. However, since this is a bargaining game the other extreme namely
that the debt holders require all 80 in order not to declare bankruptcy is equally plausible. Hence, any
split in which the equity holders receive 40γ and the debt holders receive 80 − 40γ, for γ ∈ [0, 1], can
be justiﬁed. Had the bankruptcy costs been 40% instead of 50%, the equity holders cannot squeeze the
debt holders down to less than 48. In this case only splits in which the equity holders receive 32γ and
the debt holders receive 80 − 32γ, for γ ∈ [0, 1], are possible.5 The point of our paper is that, if the
capital structure of the ﬁrm should be permanently re-optimized, the above arguments are incomplete.
The debt holders would realize that the equity holders’ threat of withholding the coupons is non-credible.
If the equity holders were faced with the alternative of withholding the coupons or to continue paying
the coupons in full, they would choose to continue paying the coupons since this gives them a value of
32 whereas withholding the coupons would give them a value of zero. Hence, if the debt holders and the
equity holders cannot come to an agreement of re-optimizing the ﬁrms capital structure, the alternative
is not that the the ﬁrm goes bankrupt, but rather it is that the equity holders continue to pay the original
coupons and that the ﬁrm survives. That is, the only thing the debt and equity holders need to bargain
about is the gain in total ﬁrm value from re-optimizing the capital structure, i.e., the diﬀerence between
a ﬁrm value of 80 and a ﬁrm value of 77. Hence, the possible value splits can be reduced to the ones
in which the equity holders receive 32 + 3γ and the debt holders receive 45 + 3(1 − γ), for γ ∈ [0, 1].
Note that this is independent of the size of the bankruptcy costs. Hence, the strategic debt service
argument can both under- and overestimate the fraction of the split that the debt holders must have as
a minimum in a capital structure renegotiation game. This looks like a minor extension of the strategic
debt service model but it is complicated by the fact that the value of the ﬁrm, if the equity holders
continue to pay the existing coupons, also includes the value of renegotiating the split of a gain from a
re-optimization of the capital structure at a diﬀerent earnings value. This fact has been ignored in our
illustrative example since we just took the ﬁrm values of 77 from the model before any renegotiations
were allowed. Our full model do take that into account and at the same time endogenously, consistently,
and simultaneously determine the ﬁrm value, the optimal capital structure, the optimal coupon size of
the debt, and the optimal actions of the equity holders including when to propose a debt restructuring
and what to propose in a continuous-time continuous-state-space setting.
In the literature there are a lot of other good explanations for why ﬁrms choose a speciﬁc capital
structure. There may be many plausible reasons why it is unrealistic to assume a symmetric information
structure as we have done in our model. The asymmetric information literature is full of explanations
5For this simple example we have ignored the fact that changing the bankruptcy costs would change the initial price of the
debt and therefore the initial optimal capital structure, the optimal coupon size, etc. However, this is only for illustrative
purpose.
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diﬀerent from our explanation. Our explanation basically says that the ﬁrm’s capital structure is deter-
mined by counterbalancing the tax advantage to debt with costs of debt restructuring or costs of ﬁnancial
distress whereas the asymmetric information literature includes agency costs and signaling issues. Myers
and Majluf (1984) argue that agency costs (cf. also Jensen and Meckling 1976) can lead to the so-called
pecking order theory of diﬀerent capital structure choices. This theory, however, is a consequence of
giving the manager of the ﬁrm the wrong incentives. If the manager’s incentives can be realigned, both
equity holders and debt holders will ex ante be better oﬀ (Dybvig and Zender 1991). In asymmetric
information models the ﬁrm’s capital structure can also be used to credibly signal the value of new in-
vestment projects and other variables that the insiders of the ﬁrm have better information about than
do the outside investors. An example of this type of model is Brennan and Kraus (1987). Going beyond
asymmetric information models also behavioral ﬁnance models and bounded rationality models can give
new explanations and insight to why ﬁrms’ capital structure is determined the way it is. However, we
think that it is important that we fully understand the simplest model of symmetric information where
the ﬁrm’s capital structure is purely driven by the trade oﬀ between the tax advantage to debt and the
costs of restructuring the debt and possible bankruptcy costs. Not until we have exhausted the implica-
tions of these assumptions should we try to add another layer of complexity to the model in order to see
if this new layer gives a better explanation of the phenomena we observe in practice.
Within the class of symmetric information dynamic capital structure models our model gives a number
of insights of which we will mention some here.
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) ﬁnd that their dynamic capital structure model gives much lower
leverage ratios than static capital structure models, ceteris paribus. By adding debt renegotiations to
the model we ﬁnd that leverage ratios increase relative to the results of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)
approximately back to the level of the static capital structure models such as Leland (1994). Moreover,
the introduction of debt renegotiations increases the tax advantage to debt by 50% relative to a dynamic
capital structure model with no debt renegotiation for realistic parameter values.
A very useful insight from Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) and Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989a) is that by no-arbitrage the unlevered ﬁrm value does not exist as a traded security and therefore
we do not have any drift restrictions on this process. Our analysis supports this insight all though we
reinterpret the equilibrium argument in the Fischer-Heinkel-Zechner model. Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001) are not willing to accept this idea that the unlevered ﬁrm value does not exist as a traded security,
and use Microsoft, which has a leverage of practically zero, as a counterexample. However, for high
growth ﬁrms like Microsoft our model predicts a capital structure of almost no debt and, hence, for these
types of ﬁrms the optimally levered ﬁrm value and the unlevered ﬁrm values are almost the same. So the
counterexample of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) does not really have any consequence.
Our model gives a simple explanation of the violation of the absolute priority rule for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress, which is a very well documented empirical observation (Weiss 1990, Eberhart, Moore, and
Roenfeldt 1990, Betker 1995). Basically, on the equilibrium path it is perfectly rational for the debt
holders to accept a restructuring proposal from the equity holders which leaves some value to the equity
holders even though the debt holders do not get their full principal back. The reason why the debt
holders do accept such a proposal is that the alternative if they reject the equity holders’ proposal is not
necessarily an immediate liquidation of the ﬁrm. In most cases the equity holders would continue to pay
the existing coupons until the conditions become even worse before eventually withholding the coupons
and de facto forcing the ﬁrm into bankruptcy. Since the value of the debt in this alternative situation is
lower than the value the debt holders get if they accept the equity holders’ proposal, they are willing to
accept the proposal even though the equity holders also get a piece of the pie.
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Finally, our model can be used to question the remarkably small empirically observed bankruptcy
costs that are reported in many studies (Warner 1977, Weiss 1990). Suppose the bankruptcy costs are
estimated as the proceeds from selling the liquidated ﬁrm’s assets or the sum of the prices of the ﬁrm’s
debt and equity after recovering from chapter 11 minus the sum of the ﬁrm’s debt and equity prices
just prior to entering chapter 11. In a symmetric information model like ours, the time as well as all
direct and indirects costs of bankruptcy are perfectly anticipated by the investors and therefore already
incorporated in the pre chapter 11 prices of the ﬁrm’s debt and equity. The post chapter 11 prices still
incorporate all indirect bankruptcy costs such as the loss of skilled employees and the loss of customer
as well as supplier conﬁdence, etc. since these costs are borne by the new ﬁrm. The direct bankruptcy
costs are borne by the old debt and equity holders and are therefore not included in the post chapter 11
prices. Hence, this method of estimating the bankruptcy costs only gives an estimate of the true direct
bankruptcy costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the framework of our EBIT based model.
We then formulate a benchmark model with no possibilities for debt term renegotiations in section 3.
In section 4 we introduce the ﬁrst simple type of debt renegotiations as an ex ante determined split of
the ﬁrm value. We attempt to improve on this simple type of debt renegotiation in section 5, where we
try to design the debt restructuring proposal in such a way that the debt holders would never reject the
oﬀer. However, this proposal requires knowledge of the values of debt and equity if the debt holders do
reject the debt restructuring oﬀer. Unfortunately, these oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values cannot be derived
from the usual solution method. In section 6 we present an iterative solution method that is capable
of deriving these oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values. In section 7 we make some comparative statics of our
model. In section 8 we discuss Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001) in relation to our model. Finally, we conclude in section 9. Appendices A and B contains the ﬁner
details of our ﬁxed point solution method.
2. Dynamic Capital Structure Models
We model a ﬁrm run by equity holders, which has issued a single class of callable perpetual corporate
debt with a ﬁxed instantaneous coupon rate, C. The call feature of debt allows equity holders to better
exploit the tax advantage to debt by increasing the amount of outstanding debt (and thereby the coupon
payment rate) when earnings increase. For tractability, the capital structure is limited to a single class of
debt. That is, we only allow the amount of outstanding debt to be increased by calling all of the existing
debt and issuing new debt.6 Debt is called at a premium and there is a cost of issuing new debt which
is proportional to the principal.
When earnings decrease, equity holders and debt holders have a common interest in restructuring the
debt to avoid bankruptcy costs. A key issue is how to distribute the value of the ﬁrm between equity
holders and debt holders when this restructuring occurs.
The dynamic adjustment of the capital structure through an inﬁnite series of calls and renegotiations
of debt imply that the ﬁrm will, in fact, never go bankrupt. Compared to most of the earlier (static)
models in the literature, such as the models by Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), and Franc¸ois and
Morellec (2002) where the debt and equity values are known when the bankruptcy and call boundaries
have been hit, the dynamic adjustment in our model leads to a ﬁxed-point problem when solving for
the initial values of debt and equity. That is, we have no exogenously given boundary conditions. The
6Otherwise, the incentive of the equity holders to sequentially increase the outstanding debt by issuing new debt with the
same seniority and thereby diluting the existing debt will lead to a market break down de facto making it impossible for
the ﬁrm to borrow at all.
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boundary conditions needed to solve for the initial values of debt and equity depend on the values of debt
and equity after the restructuring. But these in turn depend on the optimal capital structure chosen after
the restructuring. This ﬁxed-point problem has already been studied in Kane, Marcus, and McDonald
(1985), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a), and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), but as we will see,
their ﬁxed-point argument does not give the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity at the
lower boundary, which are needed to determine the relative bargaining power between the debt holders
and the equity holders in the renegotiation phase.
The ﬁrm is governed by an exogenously given underlying state variable, ξ, which is the ﬁrm’s instan-
taneous earnings before interest and tax payments (EBIT). The equity holders receive the remaining
earnings from the ﬁrm after the coupons have been paid to the debt holders and corporate taxes have
been paid to the tax authorities.7 Following Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), we call ξ the EBIT process
and assume that it follows a geometric Brownian motion under the pricing measure Q, i.e.8
(1) dξt = ξtµˆdt + ξtσdWt,
with a given starting point, ξ0. Here µˆ and σ are constants parameterizing drift and volatility and W is
a standard Brownian motion under the measure, Q. We can think of the origin of the EBIT process, ξ,
as the cash ﬂow process generated by a production technology initially owned by an entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur has the option to create a ﬁrm (at a certain cost) based on the EBIT process by issuing
equity and (callable perpetual) debt.
Moreover, assume that the riskless interest rate, r, in the economy is constant. Since there are taxes
on interest income, however, this is not the discount rate used for pricing under the pricing measure
Q. Let τi denote the tax rate on interest income in the hands of investors. The discount rate is then
(1− τi)r. This reﬂects an assumption that not only is interest income taxed at the rate of τi, but there
is also a tax subsidy at the rate of τi associated with interest expenses. Hence, thinking in terms of
dynamic replication of contingent claims, the eﬀective interest rate paid on the money market account
used for borrowing in the replicating portfolio is (1− τi)r. That is, the price of the replicating portfolio
is computed using the after-tax riskless rate. We assume throughout that µˆ < (1− τi)r, since otherwise
the cash ﬂows generated from the EBIT process will not have a ﬁnite market value.
The market value corresponding to the EBIT process is, at any given date, the total value of the
optimal mix of debt and equity that can be issued based on this EBIT process less the costs of obtaining
it (Kane, Marcus, and McDonald 1985). This value will, of course, reﬂect the advantages and drawbacks
of issuing debt including corporate tax savings as well as personal interest and dividend tax payments,
and potential bankruptcy costs (Kane, Marcus, and McDonald 1984). This value process is similar to the
unlevered ﬁrm value process, A, in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a). Note that we do not assume
that any of these two processes (neither the value of the unlevered ﬁrm, A, nor the EBIT process, ξ)
are price processes of traded securities. Hence, we do not have any no-arbitrage restrictions that give
us the drift of A and ξ under the pricing measure. However, we do assume that there exist a unique
pricing measure denoted Q. That is, we assume that there exists traded securities such that any new
7In general, tax payments can be negative if the coupon rate is higher than the EBIT. In real life this does not lead to a
symmetric tax refund. To mimic this friction the tax refunds will be reduced to a fraction, , of the original tax refund in
our model.
8Since we are working with an inﬁnite time horizon we do not want to use the term ‘equivalent martingale measure’ for Q
because with an inﬁnite time horizon the usual Girsanov measure transformation using the drift does not give an equivalent
measure. As long as we do not say anything about the EBIT process behavior under the physical measure and how the
existence of Q is related to no arbitrage under the physical measure we are on safe ground. Hence, we just take equation (1)
as a deﬁnition.
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claim that we may want to introduce can be dynamically replicated by already existing traded securities
and therefore priced.9
In section 8 we will return to how the drift, µˆ, of the EBIT process under the pricing measure can
be determined implicitly if we have simultaneous observations of the EBIT process, ξ, and some value
process of a traded security based on the EBIT process, e.g. the value process of the equity of the ﬁrm.
In our model we consider diﬀerent ways of restructuring the ﬁrm’s debt. In each case the conditions
determining when the restructuring occurs are determined by the so-called restructuring policy. The
restructuring policy is parameterized by two boundaries, the renegotiation (or bankruptcy) boundary,
¯
ξ,
and the call of debt boundary, ξ¯. That is, when ξ reaches the lower boundary,
¯
ξ, the debt is renegotiated
(or the ﬁrm is declared bankrupt) and when ξ reaches the upper boundary, ξ¯, the debt is called. Obviously,
¯
ξ < ξ0 < ξ¯. These boundaries will later be derived endogenously by incentive compatibility constraints,
but for now they are exogenously given.
The claims on the EBIT process we consider, e.g. debt and equity, will be time-homogeneous claims,
in the sense that they do not have a ﬁxed maturity. The payoﬀs depend only on the current level of ξ
and the level of ξ when the debt and equity was issued. Therefore, we denote the price at any given
date t when the EBIT process is ξt of debt and equity issued at some date s ≤ t when the EBIT process
was ξs, provided that the EBIT process {ξu}u∈[s,t] in the time period [s, t) has stayed inside the interval
(
¯
ξ, ξ¯)(= (dξs, uξs)) as D(ξt; ξs) and E(ξt; ξs).
In Appendix A we analyze the debt and equity price functions and derive (cf. equation (34) in Appen-
dix A) that both debt and equity are positive homogeneous of degree one in (ξt, ξs). That is,
D(λξt;λξs) = λD(ξt; ξs)(2)
and
E(λξt;λξs) = λE(ξt; ξs),(3)
for any ξt ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯])(= [dξs, uξs]) and λ ∈ R+.10 Note moreover, that this homogeneity property implies
that the restructuring policy (
¯
ξ, ξ¯) for each new issue of debt can be written as (dξs, uξs) for some ﬁxed
constants d and u.
Furthermore, for notational simplicity note that the initial values of debt and equity at the date when
the debt is issued can be written as
D(ξs; ξs) = ξsD(1; 1) = Dξs
and
E(ξs; ξs) = ξsE(1; 1) = Eξs,
where D and E are constants determined as D = D(1; 1) and E = E(1; 1). Here we have used the positive
homogeneity property from equations (2) and (3).
Debt is issued at par, i.e. the principal of the debt issued at date s with a coupon rate c∗ξs (cf. Part 1
of Conjecture A.1 in Appendix A) is D(ξs; ξs). The debt is callable at a premium, λ, at any given later
date t ≥ s, i.e. the debt can be called (by the equity holders) at any given date t by paying the debt
9The EBIT process, ξ, and the value process, A, of the unlevered ﬁrm are not, in general, in the set of traded securities
that can be used to dynamically replicate new (derivative) securities which are functions of the EBIT process.
10Note that we have assumed that the EBIT process {ξu}u∈[s,t] in the time period [s, t) has stayed inside the interval
(dξs, uξs). Hence, if ξt ∈ {dξs, uξs}, we know that it is the ﬁrst time since date s that it hits one of the boundaries. Thus,
we can still use the result from equation (34).
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holders (1 + λ)D(ξs; ξs).11 To issue debt there are costs proportional to the par value of the debt. We
denote the proportional factor k.12 That is, the total proceeds to the entrepreneur at date s when the
EBIT process is ξs for issuing both perpetual debt with a coupon rate c∗ξs and equity is
(4) A(ξs) = E(ξs; ξs) + (1− k)D(ξs; ξs) = ξs
(
E(1; 1) + (1− k)D(1; 1)) = Aξs,
where A is a constant deﬁned as
A = E(1; 1) + (1− k)D(1; 1) = E + (1− k)D.
Moreover, if the ﬁrm is declared bankrupt, a proportion, α, of the proceeds of the sale of the assets of
the ﬁrm (i.e. the EBIT generating process, ξ) is lost in bankruptcy costs.13 Note that the assets of the
ﬁrm is sold oﬀ as a going concern (as an acquisition), i.e. the ﬁrm is acquired by an entrepreneur who
again can optimally lever the ﬁrm.
De facto the ﬁrm is run by the equity holders in the sense that they decide (i) when to call the debt
and (ii) at each instant in time whether to pay the coupons to the debt holders or not. That is, it is the
incentives of the equity holders which endogenously determine the restructuring policy. However, both
equity holders and debt holders anticipate these incentives as soon as the coupon rate of the debt is ﬁxed
so in that sense the restructuring policy is common knowledge when the debt is issued.
The key issue is what happens at the lower restructuring boundary. We will work through three
diﬀerent assumptions of boundary behavior in order to compare the results of the diﬀerent assumptions
and to more accurately ﬁt our model within the existing literature.
3. No Renegotiations of Debt
Let us ﬁrst set up a benchmark case in which there are no possibilities for renegotiating the debt terms.
For simplicity, assume that debt is issued at date zero when the EBIT process is initiated at ξ0. When
the EBIT process, ξ, hits uξ0 the old debt is called (retired) at a premium, λ, and new debt is issued
with higher par value in order to take advantage of the higher level of the EBIT process by increasing
the tax shield. That is, we have the following values of debt and equity at the call of debt boundary, uξ0,
D(uξ0; ξ0) = (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0)
= (1 + λ)Dξ0
(5)
and
E(uξ0; ξ0) = E(uξ0;uξ0) + (1− k)D(uξ0;uξ0)− (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0)
=
(
Au− (1 + λ)D)ξ0.(6)
These equations are usually termed the value matching conditions at the upper boundary uξ0. Moreover,
the equity holders ﬁnd it optimal to call the debt when the following condition at uξ0 is fulﬁlled
(7) E1(uξ0; ξ0) = A.
11Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989b) study the ex ante optimal size of the call premium.
12These costs removes the incentive of the equity holders to restructure the debt continuously in the case where there is no
call premium of the debt, i.e. λ = 0.
13If α < λ the equity holders might (at the upper boundary) be better oﬀ withholding the coupons and thereby forcing
the ﬁrm into bankruptcy than calling the debt since the bankruptcy costs are lower than the call premium of the debt.
However, the way our model is setup we ignore such strategic behavior.
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Here E1 denotes the partial derivative of the equity price function (ξ, ξ0) → E(ξ, ξ0) with respect to the
ﬁrst variable, ξ.14 This condition is usually termed the smooth pasting condition at the upper boundary
uξ0.15
When the governing state variable, ξ, hits dξ0 the equity holders withhold the coupon rate to the debt
holders who immediately declare the ﬁrm bankrupt. The assets of the ﬁrm, i.e. the EBIT process, ξ, is
acquired as a going concern by a new entrepreneur who again can lever the ﬁrm optimally.16 A fraction,
α, of the proceeds covers the bankruptcy costs. The rest of the proceeds goes ﬁrst to the debt holders to
cover their original principal and ﬁnally to the equity holders. This is in accordance with the absolute
priority rule. However, because the equity holders have limited liability, in most bankruptcy cases, the
debt holders will not be able to get their full principal back. This happens when the proceeds from the
sales less the bankruptcy costs are smaller than the original debt principal. Hence, we have the following
value matching conditions at dξ0
D(dξ0; ξ0) = min
{
(1− α)(E(dξ0; dξ0) + (1− k)D(dξ0; dξ0)),D(ξ0; ξ0)
}
= min
{
(1− α)Ad,D}ξ0
(8)
and
E(dξ0; ξ0) = max
{
(1− α)(E(dξ0; dξ0) + (1− k)D(dξ0; dξ0))−D(ξ0; ξ0), 0
}
= max
{
(1− α)Ad−D, 0}ξ0.
(9)
Moreover, the equity holders ﬁnd it optimal to declare bankruptcy (by withholding the coupons to the
debt holders) when the following smooth pasting condition at dξ0 is fulﬁlled
(10) E1(dξ0; ξ0) = (1− α)A1{(1−α)Ad≥D}.
In Appendix B we verify that there exists a ﬁxed-point solution for the prices of debt and equity. From
this solution we derive the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm.
In ﬁgure 1 we have depicted the ﬁxed-point solutions for debt and equity for the set of base case
parameters considered in section 7. The ﬁgure shows the value of debt and equity separately as functions
of the current EBIT value, ξ. The debt was issued with an optimal coupon rate of c∗ = .63 at date zero
when the initial EBIT value, ξ0, was one. The lower limit on the horizontal axis is the optimal bankruptcy
boundary, d = .21, and the upper limit is the optimal call of debt boundary, u = 2.63, given the debt
14This comes from diﬀerentiating on both sides of the value matching condition for equity, equation (6), with respect to
the running EBIT value, ξ, and evaluating it for ξ = uξ0. To be exact, the left-hand side of equation (7) is
∂
∂ξ
E(ξ; ξ0)
∣∣∣∣
ξ=uξ0
= E1(uξ0; ξ0)
and the right hand side is
∂
∂ξ
(
E(ξ; ξ) + (1− k)D(ξ; ξ)− (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0)
) ∣∣∣∣
ξ=uξ0
=
∂
∂ξ
(
ξ
(
E(1; 1) + (1− k)D(1; 1)) − (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0)
) ∣∣∣∣
ξ=uξ0
=
∂
∂ξ
(
Aξ − (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0)
) ∣∣∣∣
ξ=uξ0
= A.
Cf., e.g., Dixit (1993) for more about this subject.
15This (or similar) smooth pasting or high contact condition is used throughout the literature (Merton 1973, Leland 1994,
Mella-Barral 1999). Merton (1973, footnote 60) is the only one giving an argument for the validity of this condition. Cf.
Dixit (1991), Dixit (1993), Brekke and Øksendal (1991), and Brekke and Øksendal (1994) for explanations of what type of
optimality this condition leads to.
16Note that compared to most of the other models in the literature, cf. e.g. the models by Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju,
and Leland (2001), we allow the ﬁrm to continue operation and to be optimally levered again by the (possible) new owner
instead of introducing an ad hoc liquidation value of the assets of the ﬁrm.
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Figure 1. Debt and equity values both with ﬁxed coupon rate, c∗, (ﬁxed optimally
when the debt is initially issued at date zero when ξ0 = 1) and with a coupon rate which
is continuously optimally determined to the given EBIT level, ξ, as a function of the
EBIT level, ξ, for the model with no possibilities of renegotiations of the debt terms in
the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%,
α = 25%, k = 3%, and  = 50%.
that has been issued at date zero. The optimal coupon rate is also depicted. Notice that the equity value
at the lower boundary smooth pastes horizontally to zero and that the debt value is below its par value
(D(1; 1)) indicating that the debt holders do not get their full par value when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
Note also how the debt value function is literally horizontal for high values of EBIT. In ﬁgure 1 we have
also depicted the ﬁxed-point solutions for the sum of the values of debt and equity, E(ξ; 1) + D(ξ; 1), in
order to compare it with the value, E(ξ; ξ) + D(ξ; ξ), of an artiﬁcial ﬁrm which at any instant in time
has the optimal capital structure. Notice that within the range determined by the debt restructuring
policy the diﬀerence in value between these two are fairly small. By no-arbitrage the diﬀerence is actually
determined by the costs of obtaining the optimal capital structure. Hence, at the upper boundary it is
the issuing costs of the new debt, kDu, and at the lower boundary it is bankruptcy costs and the issuing
costs of new debt, αAd + kDd.
In ﬁgure 2 we have depicted various results of the model as a function of the fractional reduction, ,
of the tax rate when EBT is negative. In ﬁgure 2(a) we see the debt restructuring policy, (d, u), and the
optimal coupon rate, c∗. Note that as the possibilities for getting tax refunds when EBT is negative get
better, the higher the optimal coupon rate is, and the more often it is optimal for the ﬁrm to re-optimize
its capital structure, i.e., the interval [d, u] shrinks. In ﬁgure 2(b) we see how the initial values of debt,
D, and equity, E, change as the possibilities of getting tax refunds change. In this ﬁgure we have also
depicted the total value to the original entrepreneur, E + (1− k)D, and the key ﬁgure, TAD, measuring
the tax advantage to debt, which is deﬁned as
TAD =
E + (1− k)D
1−τe
(1−τi)r−µˆ
− 1.
This number gives the increase in percentage terms of the whole ﬁrm value relative to an (in-optimally)
100% equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm (Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 2001). Surprisingly enough, even though TAD
more than doubles from around 8% to 18% as the possibilities for getting tax refunds when EBT is
negative increase from no refund to full refund, the total ﬁrm value to the original entrepreneur is almost
constant.17 In Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) they report a tax advantage to debt of around 8% for
 = .5, whereas we have a tax advantage to debt of around 10%. The reason why our tax advantage to
17Strictly speaking it is not correct to depict TAD in the same ﬁgure as D, E, and E+(1−k)D since TAD is in percentage
terms whereas the others are in EBIT units.
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Figure 2. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the fractional reduction, , of the tax rate when EBT is negative
for the model with no possibilities of renegotiations of the debt terms in the base case:
µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1−τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, and k = 3%.
debt is higher is because we allow for further tax advantages to debt even after a bankruptcy in that we
allow for the ﬁrm, ξ, to be acquired as a going concern by a new entrepreneur, cf. equations (8) and (9).
In ﬁgure 2(c) the initial leverage ratio in percentage terms (the capital structure of the ﬁrm) is depicted
as a function of the possibilities for getting tax refunds when EBT is negative. It should be noted that
this is only depicting the initial (and optimal) capital structure of the ﬁrm. As it can be seen from
ﬁgure 1, the capital structure varies dynamically in a fairly large range (15%–100%) in the base case until
it is optimal again to re-optimize the capital structure. Finally, ﬁgure 2(d) depicts the initial yield of the
debt issued measured as the coupon rate relative to the par value of the debt. Subtracting the before
tax riskless interest rate, r, from this number gives the yield spread of the issued (risky) debt. Notice
that the initial yield spread varies from around 80 basis points to 180 basis points as the possibilities for
getting tax refunds when EBT is negative increase from no refund to full refund. But again this is only
the initial yield spread. Yield spreads observed at other dates than the issuing dates can (in the base
case) vary from around 70 basis points when the debt is close to being called to over 900 basis points
when the bankruptcy threat is imminent.
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Figure 3. Debt and equity values both with ﬁxed coupon rate, c∗, (ﬁxed optimally
when the debt is initially issued at date zero when ξ0 = 1) and with a coupon rate which
is continuously optimally determined to the given EBIT level, ξ, as a function of the
EBIT level, ξ, using the ﬁrst attempt to model renegotiations in the base case: µˆ = 2%,
σ = 25%, r(1− τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, η = 12.5%,
and  = 50%.
4. Renegotiation of Debt: A First Attempt
After having solved the debt equity valuation problem in the benchmark case with no possibilities for
renegotiations of the debt terms, we investigate other types of behavior at the lower boundary of the
EBIT process. We assume that debt is issued at date zero when the EBIT process is initiated at ξ0.
The call feature of the debt is exactly identical to the case with no renegotiation of debt in section 3.
Hence, the upper value matching conditions from equations (5) and (6) and the corresponding smooth
pasting condition from equation (7) are identical. However, the behavior on the lower boundary,
¯
ξ = dξ0,
is changed.
When the governing state variable, ξ, hits dξ0 the old debt is renegotiated in the following way: the old
debt is retired and new debt with lower par value and coupon rate is issued in order to avoid bankruptcy.
An a priori ﬁxed fraction η ∈ [0, 1] of the total proceeds goes to the equity holders and the rest goes to
the original debt holders.18 That is, we have the following value matching conditions at dξ0
D(dξ0; ξ0) = (1− η)
(
E(dξ0; dξ0) + (1− k)D(dξ0; dξ0)
)
= (1− η)Adξ0
(11)
and
E(dξ0; ξ0) = η
(
E(dξ0; dξ0) + (1− k)D(dξ0; dξ0)
)
= ηAdξ0.
(12)
Moreover, the equity holders ﬁnd it optimal to initiate the renegotiation of the debt when the following
smooth pasting condition at dξ0 is fulﬁlled
(13) E1(dξ0; ξ0) = ηA.
Finding the ﬁxed-point solution for the debt and equity values and verifying Conjecture A.1 in Appendix A
is done exactly as in the previous section (section 3).
In ﬁgure 3 we have depicted the ﬁxed-point solutions for debt and equity in the case where there are
renegotiations at the lower boundary. We have again used the set of base case parameters considered in
section 7. In addition we have set η = 12.5%. Comparing the renegotiation case with the no-renegotiation
18The economic interpretation of the constant η is that it is a way of distributing bargaining power between the debt holders
and the equity holders in the phase of the debt renegotiations.
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Figure 4. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as function of the fraction of bargaining power the equity holders have, η, using
the ﬁrst attempt to model renegotiations in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1− τi) =
4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, and  = 50%.
case from ﬁgure 1 we see that the equity holders actually do have some value at the lower boundary and
that the optimal coupon rate, c∗, has increased by close to 50%. Moreover, the lower boundary itself is
also increased by around 50% from .21 to .32 and the upper boundary has decreased from around 2.63
to 2.30.
In ﬁgure 4 we have depicted various results of the model as function of the fraction of bargaining power
the equity holders have, η. In ﬁgure 4(a) we see the debt restructuring policy, (d, u), and the optimal
coupon rate, c∗. Note that the higher the fraction of bargaining power the equity holders have the smaller
the interval [d, u]. In ﬁgure 4(b) we see how the initial values of debt, D, and equity, E, change as the
fraction of bargaining power the equity holders have change. We have also depicted the total proceeds to
the original entrepreneur, E + (1− k)D. If we assume that debt holders and equity holders can commit
themselves to a given ﬁxed distribution of bargaining power, η, then ex ante both parties will be best
oﬀ if η = 15% since this value of η maximizes E + (1 − k)D. This level of η is indicated by the dotted
vertical line in all four sub-ﬁgures of ﬁgure 4. It is interesting to note that it is ex ante optimal to let the
equity holders have such a large part of the restructured ﬁrm value less the costs of obtaining the optimal
capital structure. A lower η value would, ceteris paribus, increase the debt value because the debt holders
get more at each renegotiation. Therefore, the tax shield is better exploited. On the other hand, the
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equity holders get less. Since it is the equity holders who decide when to propose the restructure, a lower
η will postpone a potential restructuring for both low and high EBIT values. This latter eﬀect reduces
ﬁrm value because the ﬁrm’s capital structure is not re-optimized to exploited the tax shield so often.
Hence, the tax shield is exploited less eﬃciently. These two eﬀects, a static eﬀect demanding a low η and
a dynamic eﬀect demanding a high η, counterbalances each other at an η level of .15. In ﬁgure 4(c) the
initial leverage ratio in percentage terms is depicted as function of the fraction of bargaining power the
equity holders have. As it is seen, the leverage falls as the fraction of bargaining power the equity holders
have increase. Finally ﬁgure 4(d) depicts the initial yield of the debt, which have a tendency to increase
as the fraction of bargaining power the equity holders have increase.
The way this renegotiation is setup is quite simple: together the equity holders and the debt holders
will be better oﬀ by re-optimizing the capital structure of the ﬁrm to the optimal one based on the current
value of EBIT. However, there are costs of obtaining this since they have to issue new debt. Still, if
the current EBIT value is far enough away from the EBIT value at the date when the current capital
structure was determined the beneﬁts (in form of increased market value of the whole ﬁrm) will outweigh
the costs of obtaining the optimal capital structure. But this simple renegotiation does not contribute
much to the question of how this gain from the debt restructuring should be split between the original
debt holders and equity holders. As it is, we just imagine that both equity holders and debt holders
have already put all their old claims on the ﬁrm into one pot and forgotten how much each of them have
contributed to the pot. After the re-optimization of the capital structure they start negotiating about
how to split the pot between them. This is not a very realistic or satisfactory way of thinking of the debt
renegotiation.
We would like to think of the outcome of this debt renegotiation as an agreement between the debt
holders and the equity holders made voluntarily in the sense that both parties can reject the renegotiation.
As we have set up the model, the initiative to propose the restructuring is with the equity holders since
the smooth pasting condition is based on the equity value. That is, we can interpret the renegotiation
as a one-shot take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the debt holders proposed by the equity holders. Since it is the
equity holders who time when they make this oﬀer it will of course be beneﬁcial for the equity holders—
otherwise they would not have done it. So the equity holders would never like to reject their own debt
restructuring proposal. The question is whether the debt holders would like to accept the proposal or
not. That of course depends on what would happen if they reject the debt restructuring proposal. As a
ﬁrst attempt we simply assume that the threat of the equity holders is that if the debt holders do not
accept their restructuring proposal, then the equity holders would withhold the coupon rate which again
would trigger an immediate declaration of bankruptcy by the debt holders. If this is a credible threat by
the equity holders, the debt holders would accept the restructuring proposal whenever η ≤ α. (If η > α
the debt holders could get more by declaring the ﬁrm bankrupt than by accepting the equity holders’
debt restructuring proposal unless the proposal is made for a very high value of ξ.) Hence, as a ﬁrst
attempt, we assume that η, which reﬂects the distribution of bargaining power between debt holders and
equity holders, is in the interval [0, α].
5. Renegotiation of Debt: A Second Attempt
The problem with our ﬁrst attempt to model the renegotiation game is that it is not obvious that
the threat of the equity holders of withholding the coupons if the debt holders reject their restructuring
proposal is a credible threat. In fact, it almost never is, because if the debt holders declare the ﬁrm
bankrupt the equity holders would in most cases get nothing (unless the proposal is made for a fairly
high value of ξ so that there would be something left for the equity holders after the bankruptcy costs
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have been paid and the debt holders have gotten their full principal back). In most cases, it would be
better for the equity holders to continue paying the original coupon rate (or maybe try to reduce them
marginally as in the strategic debt service models (Anderson and Sundaresan 1996, Mella-Barral and
Perraudin 1997))19 and thereby avoiding bankruptcy if their restructuring proposal is rejected by the
debt holders. We would still like to model the renegotiation procedure as if the equity holders make a
one-shot take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the debt holders. Moreover, the proposal should be made so that it is
always accepted by the debt holders.
We assume that if the debt restructuring proposal is rejected, either the equity holders will continue
to pay the existing coupon rate or they will withhold the coupon rate, which leads to an immediate
declaration of bankruptcy. First let us analyze the situation at the lower boundary, dξ0, which is the
point where we assume that the equity holders make their restructuring proposal. If the equity holders
continue to pay the original coupon rate (after a rejection) the equity value is
¯
Ec ≡ E(dξ0; ξ0).
On the other hand, if the equity holders withhold the original coupon rate the ﬁrm is declared bankrupt
and the equity value is
¯
Eb ≡ max{(1− α)Ad−D, 0}ξ0.
It is the equity holders who determine whether to continue to pay the original coupon rate or to de facto
declare bankruptcy if the restructuring proposal is rejected. Hence, the equity value is the maximum of
the two alternatives, i.e.
¯
Enr ≡ max{
¯
Ec,
¯
Eb}.
The corresponding value of the debt in case of a rejection of the equity holders’ restructuring proposal
depends on the choice of the equity holders. If the equity holders continue to pay the original coupon
rate the value of the debt is
¯
Dc ≡ D(dξ0; ξ0)
in which case the debt holders are not in a position to force bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the
equity holders do not pay the original coupon rate, the debt holders immediately declare bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy value of debt is
¯
Db ≡ min{(1− α)Ad,D}ξ0.
The choice of whether to declare bankruptcy or to continue to pay the original coupon rate, after the
debt holders have rejected the restructuring proposal, is in the hands of the equity holders. Therefore,
the value of the debt is
¯
Dnr ≡
¯
Dc1{
¯
Ec≥
¯
Eb} + ¯
Db1{
¯
Ec<
¯
Eb}.
Knowing the value of debt and equity if a debt restructuring oﬀer is rejected, we can compute the gain
from the debt restructuring as the value of the optimally levered ﬁrm less the costs of obtaining the
optimal leverage minus the value the ﬁrm would have had if the restructuring proposal was rejected as
(14)
¯
R = Adξ0 − (¯E
nr +
¯
Dnr).
We now assume that this debt restructuring gain,
¯
R, is distributed between the equity holders and the
debt holders so that the equity holders receives the a priori ﬁxed fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of this gain and the
19It is not this type of strategic debt service that we pursuit in this model. As already argued in the introduction of the
paper we consider this type of behavior unrealistic as it is not what we observe in practice. Our model is build to capture
the incentives to restructure the entire debt with new principal and new coupon rate so that the equity holders can make
a fresh start.
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debt holders receive the remaining fraction 1 − γ.20 Hence, the new value matching conditions at the
lower boundary, dξ0, are
D(dξ0; ξ0) = (1− γ)¯R + ¯D
nr(15)
and
E(dξ0; ξ0) = γ¯
R +
¯
Enr.(16)
The idea behind this new attempt is that it should ensure that both equity holders and debt holders will
voluntarily accept the restructuring proposal since both parties are promised a value which is at least as
high as the value they would have had if the debt restructuring proposal was rejected. The idea is that if
¯
R is non-negative each party get a positive fraction of the gain in addition to their own rejection value.
Unfortunately, the equations (15) and (16) does not give a unique distribution of the values of debt and
equity in the case where, if the restructuring proposal is rejected, it is optimal to continue paying at the
existing coupon rate. That is, if we assume
¯
Ec ≥
¯
Eb then
¯
Dnr =
¯
Dc = D(dξ0; ξ0) and ¯
Enr =
¯
Ec = E(dξ0; ξ0),
which from equation (14) imply that
¯
R = Adξ0 − (¯E
c +
¯
Dc).
But since
¯
Ec +
¯
Dc = E(dξ0; ξ0) + D(dξ0; ξ0) = Adξ0
at the lower restructuring boundary, we have that
(17)
¯
R = 0.
However, if
¯
R = 0 then equations (15) and (16) are vacuous. Hence, we cannot say anything about
how much of Adξ0 to give to the equity holders and how much to give to the debt holders. That is, in
the language of the model in the previous section (section 4), η can be anything in the interval [0, 1].
The indeterminacy of the distribution between debt holders and equity holders come from the following
circularity. Because it is common knowledge when the equity holders make their restructuring proposal
and also what they will propose, the debt and equity values at the boundaries just prior to when the
restructuring proposal is made are by no-arbitrage determined by how much each party will get after
the restructuring oﬀer is accepted. But the debt restructuring proposal itself is determined by the values
of debt and equity if the debt restructuring proposal is not accepted, which in this case is the values of
debt and equity if we continue with the original coupon rate. These values, however, should include that
the equity holders will have incentive to make a new debt restructuring proposal in, say, a few seconds.
That is, these values must be equal to the values of debt and equity if the debt restructuring proposal is
accepted. This is why we get
¯
R = 0. Expressed in another way, our problem is that we are not able to
determine the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity individually.
In the case where
¯
Ec <
¯
Eb, the model is identical to the model derived in the previous section
(section 4) with η = γα.
Hence, our second attempt did not bring us any new aspects to how to endogenously determine the
distribution of Ad between debt holders and equity holders. However, it have highlighted that the problem
20Again the economic interpretation of γ is that it is a way of modeling the distribution of bargaining power between debt
holders and equity holders in the phase of the debt renegotiation.
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is to determine the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity individually when ξ0 = 1. That is,
E(d; 1) and D(d; 1).
6. Renegotiation of Debt: The Iterative Approach
One way to get the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity individually is by the following
iterative procedure. Imagine that there are a commonly known ﬁnite number, n ∈ N, of options to propose
a restructuring of the ﬁrm’s debt. Whenever the equity holders make a debt restructuring proposal this
number is reduced by one. When there are no more restructuring options left (when n = 0) the only
possibility at the lower boundary is to declare bankruptcy. This case with no more restructuring options
left is exactly our benchmark case, which we have studied extensively in section 3. If we augment our
notation of the value of debt and equity, the incentive compatible restructuring policy parameters, and
the optimal coupon rate parameter with the remaining number of restructuring proposals, we have in
section 3 derived the functions D(ξt; ξs, 0) and E(ξt; ξs, 0) giving us the value of debt and equity when the
current value of the EBIT process is ξt and the coupon rate of the existing debt is c∗0ξs. In section 3 we
have also derived that the incentive compatible restructuring policy is (d0ξs, u0ξs) and that the optimal
coupon rate to be used at every future restructuring is c∗0 multiplied by the value of the EBIT process at
the date when the new debt is issued.
With this information at hand we have the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity if there
is one restructuring option left. This is so, because as soon as the equity holders have made the debt
restructuring proposal the last restructuring options is exercised and there are no more options left.
Hence, the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity, i.e., the debt and equity values if the
debt restructuring proposal is rejected are already known from the benchmark case. Thus, we are now
able to derive the value functions of debt and equity, D(·; ·, 1), E(·; ·, 1), the new incentive compatible
restructuring policy parameters d1 and u1, and the new optimal coupon rate parameter, c∗1. With this
information at hand we have the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity if there are two
restructuring options left.
The idea is to continue this iterative procedure until the debt and equity values, the incentive compat-
ible restructuring policy parameters, and the optimal coupon rate parameter converge. In each iteration
we face a problem very similar to the one solved in sections 3 and 4. That is, we have to use our
conjecture-veriﬁcation argument from appendices A and B in each iteration. To be precise, assume that
we have the values of debt and equity, D(ξt; ξs, n− 1) and E(ξt; ξs, n− 1), when the current value of the
EBIT process is ξt and the coupon rate of the existing debt is c∗n−1ξs and there are n − 1 restructuring
options left. Our problem is now to ﬁnd the value functions of debt and equity, D(·; ·, n) and E(·; ·, n),
the new incentive compatible restructuring policy parameters, dn and un, and the new optimal coupon
rate parameter, c∗n, when there are n restructuring options left. To solve that problem we ﬁrst have to
specify the new value matching and smooth pasting conditions.
The upper value matching and smooth pasting conditions are the same as used in all the previous
cases. That is, we have the following value matching conditions for debt and equity at the call of debt
boundary, unξ0,
D(unξ0; ξ0, n) = (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0, n)
= (1 + λ)Dnξ0
(18)
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and
E(unξ0; ξ0, n) = E(unξ0;unξ0, n) + (1− k)D(unξ0;unξ0, n)− (1 + λ)D(ξ0; ξ0, n)
=
(
Anun − (1 + λ)Dn
)
ξ0.
(19)
Moreover, the equity holders ﬁnd it optimal to call the debt when the following smooth pasting condition
at uξ0 is fulﬁlled
(20) E1(unξ0; ξ0, n) = An.
At the lower boundary we will use the ideas from the model in the previous section (section 5). That
is, we ﬁrst have to calculate the gain from restructuring. If the equity holders choose to continue to pay
the existing coupon rate (after a rejection) their equity value will be
¯
Ecn ≡ E(dnξ0;
c∗n
c∗n−1
ξ0, n− 1) = E(dn; c
∗
n
c∗n−1
, n− 1)ξ0.
As soon as the equity holders have proposed the restructuring, one renegotiation option is lost. Therefore,
in order to calculate the value of continuing with the existing coupon rate we should use the already
calculated equity value function for n−1 remaining renegotiation options. Moreover, the existing coupon
rate is C∗n = c
∗
nξ0. So the question is, at which EBIT level, ξ, would it had been optimal (with only
n − 1 renegotiations options left) to choose the same coupon rate, C∗n. Since the optimal coupon rate
parameter (with only n − 1 renegotiations options left) is c∗n−1 the equity value of continuing with the
existing coupon rate must be calculated as if the debt has been issued when the EBIT value, ξ, was
c∗n
c∗n−1
ξ0 because that would have given an optimal coupon rate of21
c∗n−1
c∗n
c∗n−1
ξ0 = c∗nξ0 = C
∗
n.
Similarly, because one of the renegotiation options is lost, the bankruptcy value for the equity holders is
¯
Ebn ≡ max
{
(1− α)(E(dnξ0; dnξ0, n− 1) + (1− k)D(dnξ0; dnξ0, n− 1))−D(ξ0; ξ0, n), 0}
= max
{
(1− α)An−1dn −Dn, 0
}
ξ0.
Since it is still the equity holders who determine whether to continue to pay the original coupon rate or
to de facto declare bankruptcy, if the restructuring proposal is rejected, the equity value is the maximum
of the two alternatives, i.e.
¯
Enrn ≡ max{¯E
c
n, ¯
Ebn}.
The corresponding value of the debt in case of a rejection of the equity holders’ restructuring proposal
depends on the choice of the equity holders. If the equity holders continue to pay the coupon rate the
debt holders have a claim with value
¯
Dcn ≡ D(dnξ0;
c∗n
c∗n−1
ξ0, n− 1) = D(dn; c
∗
n
c∗n−1
, n− 1)ξ0
21This procedure of re-adjusting the initial level of the EBIT, ξ0, in order to get the coupon rate right with one renegotiation
option less left does not necessarily give that the debt will have the same principal with n − 1 renegotiation options left
as was the case with n renegotiation options left even though the coupon rate is right. In fact, the principal will only be
of the right size if D(1; 1, n) = D(1;
c∗n
c∗n−1
, n − 1). However, this is only a minor inexactitude of our numerical procedure
for two reasons. (i) The principal will only play a role if either (a) the debt is called or (b) if the ﬁrm is liquidated and
the acquisition value of the ﬁrm net of bankruptcy costs is higher than the principal. When the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress
neither (a) nor (b) is the case and therefore the value of the debt is fairly insensitive to the exact size of the principal of
the debt. (ii) When n goes to inﬁnity our numerical calculations show that D(1; 1, n)−D(1; c
∗
n
c∗n−1
, n− 1) converge to zero.
Hence, in the limit the principal will be of the right size, cf. ﬁgure 5.
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in which case the debt holders are not in a position to force bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the equity
holders do not pay the coupons, the debt holders declare bankruptcy. The bankruptcy value of debt is
¯
Dbn ≡ min
{
(1− α)(E(dnξ0; dnξ0, n− 1) + (1− k)D(dnξ0; dnξ0, n− 1)),D(ξ0; ξ0, n)}
= min
{
(1− α)An−1dn,Dn
}
ξ0.
Since the choice of whether to declare bankruptcy or to continue to pay the original coupon rate, after
the debt holders have rejected the restructuring proposal, is in the hands of the equity holders, the value
of the debt is
¯
Dnrn = ¯
Dcn1{
¯
Ecn≥¯E
b
n} + ¯
Dbn1{
¯
Ecn<¯
Ebn}.
We can now compute the gain from the debt renegotiation as the value of the optimally levered ﬁrm less
the costs of obtaining the optimal leverage minus the value the ﬁrm would have had if the restructuring
proposal was rejected as
(21)
¯
Rn = An−1dnξ0 − (¯E
nr
n + ¯
Dnrn ).
Again we distribute this gain from the debt restructuring between the equity holders and the debt holders
so that the equity holders receives the a priori ﬁxed fraction γ and the debt holders receive the remaining
fraction 1− γ. Hence, the new value matching conditions at the lower boundary, dnξ0, are
D(dnξ0; ξ0, n) = (1− γ)¯Rn + ¯D
nr
n(22)
and
E(dnξ0; ξ0, n) = γ¯
Rn + ¯
Enrn .(23)
The new smooth pasting condition is obtained by diﬀerentiating with respect to ξ and evaluating for
ξ = dnξ0 on both sides of equation (23), cf. footnote 14,
(24) E1(dξ0; ξ0, n) =
∂
∂ξ
(
γ
¯
Rn + ¯
Enrn
) ∣∣∣
ξ=dnξ0
.
This gives us the necessary equations to solve for the debt and equity values for n remaining restructuring
options by the same procedure as outlined in sections 2 and 3. Of course, we have to go through
the whole procedure of conjecturing and checking the conjecture as outlined in appendices A and B,
cf. Conjecture A.1, for each additional renegotiation option added, n. Starting with the values from
section 3 for zero remaining renegotiations options this inductive procedure should eventually lead to
a convergent solution as n goes to inﬁnity, which takes into account the debt holders’ right to reject
any restructuring proposal and continue with the original coupon rate. Numerical experiments shows
that the results stabilize quite quickly (after approximately 10-20 iterations depending on the parameters
and the accuracy required). In the base case the convergence can be followed in ﬁgure 5. In spirit this
solution procedure is similar to the ﬁnite number of sequential oﬀers reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria
used in the Rubinstein bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982, Rubinstein 1987). In a standard Rubinstein
sequential oﬀer bargaining game with no limit on the number of sequential oﬀers any split of the value
is a Nash equilibrium. Put popularly, as long as there is no rule for what will happen, if the players
cannot come to an agreement on a split of the value, they will continue to negotiate forever. If a ﬁnal
stage is introduced with an exogenously given ﬁxed split of the value (in our case this is liquidation of the
ﬁrm) then there is only one Nash equilibrium for any bargaining game with a ﬁnite number of sequential
oﬀers until the ﬁnal stage is reached.22 Our iterative solution procedure is ﬁnding this limiting Nash
22This is one mechanism to formalize what will happen if the players cannot come to an agreement.
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Figure 5. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the number of restructuring options, n, for the iterative model
in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%,
α = 25%, k = 3%, γ = 50%, and  = 50%.
equilibrium as the number of remaining sequential oﬀers goes to inﬁnity. This solution procedure is also
proposed (without any relation to Rubinstein bargaining or other economic arguments) by Øksendal and
Sulem (2001, Chapter 4) as a way to approximate the solution to an impulse control problem by solving
a series of iterated optimal stopping time problems more or less the same way as we do in our numerical
procedure. Moreover, Øksendal and Sulem (2001) show (under standard regularity conditions) that the
proposed solution procedure do lead to a solution that gives the optimal value function of the problem,
i.e. the optimal ﬁrm value as well as the optimal values of debt and equity, etc. The procedure do also
give optimal controls, i.e. an optimal debt coupon rate and an optimal restructuring policy, but as it
is common for optimal control problems, the proposed optimal controls are not unique. That is, there
might be other debt coupon rates and corresponding restructuring policies which can lead to the same
optimal ﬁrm value and debt and equity values.
Firstly, in ﬁgure 5 we study the convergence to the ﬁx point as the number of restructuring options,
n, goes to inﬁnity. Figure 5(a) shows the upper and lower restructuring boundaries as a function of the
number of remaining restructuring options. The levels of the boundaries quickly stabilize around their
ﬁxed points. The same is true for the debt and equity values and their derived key ﬁgures TAD, total
ﬁrm value, leverage, and yield spread in ﬁgures 5(b), 5(c), and 5(d). More restructuring options allow the
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Figure 6. Debt and equity values both with ﬁxed coupon rate, c∗, (ﬁxed optimally when
the debt is initially issued at date zero when ξ0 = 1) and with a coupon rate which is
continuously optimally determined to the given EBIT level, ξ, as a function of the EBIT
level, ξ, for the iterative model in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%,
τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, γ = 50%, and  = 50%.
ﬁrm to better exploit of the tax shield and to avoid bankruptcy. This increases the tax advantage to debt
as seen from the TAD graph in ﬁgure 5(b) and narrows the interval [d, u] in ﬁgure 5(a) as the number of
restructuring options increase. This in turn increases the total ﬁrm value marginally (cf. ﬁgure 5(b)) while
shifting the capital structure towards more debt (cf. ﬁgure 5(c)). This explains why the equity value is
lower and why the debt value is higher when there are more options to renegotiate (cf. ﬁgure 5(b)). Note,
however, that the restructuring boundaries as well as the values of debt and equity and their derived
key ﬁgures, TAD, total ﬁrm value, leverage, and yield spread, for zero remaining renegotiation options,
n = 0, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ﬁxed point values derived when there are many remaining
renegotiation options. Hence, the conclusions derived from a model with the debt renegotiation option
at the lower boundary are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from similar conclusions derived from a model ignoring
the debt renegotiation option at the lower boundary as e.g., Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) and
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001).
In ﬁgure 6 we have depicted the ﬁxed-point solutions for debt and equity for the iterative model after
convergence (n = 10) for the set of base case parameters considered in section 7. Here and throughout
we denote the convergent solutions by omitting n in the notation. The solutions look very similar to the
solutions we had for our simple renegotiation of debt model from section 4, cf. ﬁgure 3. At the lower
boundary, ξ = .31 the equity holders have a value of around .94 and the debt holders have a value of
around 6.17. That the equity holders get 13.2% of the total value at the lower boundary indicates that
the alternative, if the equity holder’s restructuring proposal had been rejected by the debt holders, would
have been to continue with the existing debt. Because if the alternative for the equity holders would have
been to withhold the coupons then the equity holders should only have had γα = 12.5% of the total value,
cf. equation (23). Note the relatively small diﬀerence between E(ξ; ξ) +D(ξ; ξ) and E(ξ; 1) +D(ξ; 1), cf.
ﬁgure 6 at the ﬁxed point. This substantiates our earlier claim that in the case where
¯
Ec ≥
¯
Eb then the
gain to leverage,
¯
R, is zero at each single restructuring, cf. equation (17). In fact, at the ﬁxed point, if
¯
Ec ≥
¯
Eb then the diﬀerence at the boundaries between E(ξ; ξ) + D(ξ; ξ) and E(ξ; 1) + D(ξ; 1) is exactly
the issuing costs of new debt, i.e., kdD at the lower boundary and kuD at the upper boundary.
Moreover, the fact that the equity holders get as much as 13.2% of the total proceeds in the debt
renegotiation looks ex post like a serious violation of the absolute priority rule in the sense that the
equity holders get a signiﬁcant fraction of the value even though the debt holders have not gotten their
full principal back—in this case the debt holders only get 58% of their principal back. However, the debt
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The risk neutral drift of the EBIT process µˆ 2%
The volatility of the EBIT process σ 25%
The after-tax riskless interest rate r(1− τi) 4.5%
The tax rate on interest payments τi 35%
The eﬀective tax rate on dividends τe 50%
The debt call premium λ 5%
The bankruptcy costs α 25%
The restructuring costs or more precisely the issuing costs of new debt k 3%
The distribution of bargaining power between debt and equity holders γ 50%
The fractional reduction of the tax rate when EBT is negative  50%
Table 1. Base case parameter values.
holders are still getting a better deal than if they had rejected the equity holders’ restructuring oﬀer.
Because in that case, the equity holders would have continued paying the coupon rate a little longer
before withholding the coupons. From ﬁgure 1 we see that the value of the debt in that case is around
4.85 at ξ = .31 which is clearly lower than 6.17. When there are no restructuring options left (n = 0) in
our model the absolute priority rule is not violated.23
7. Comparative statics and Numerical results for the Iterative Approach.
In this section we study the numerical solutions of our iterative model. Since we do not have a formula
for the debt and equity values we can write down and take derivatives of etc., we will have to show all
the comparative statics by graphs. Most of the results presented in this section are quite intuitive and
as we would expect them to be given our knowledge about the models in the earlier literature. However,
we do not think that this makes these results obsolete because it is our only way of demonstrating how
our model behaves. We will be quite brief and only comment on the surprising and interesting results.
Our base case parameters for the comparative statics are given in table 1
In ﬁgure 7 we study the eﬀect of changing the bargaining power distribution, γ. The equity value
increases as more and more bargaining power is distributed to the equity holders. At the same time the
leverage goes down marginally and the yield spread is increased. The results are very similar to our ﬁrst
attempt to model renegotiations of debt in section 4, cf. ﬁgure 4. Note that η corresponds to γα so the
scaling on the horizontal axis is diﬀerent. At ﬁrst it seems plausible that the equity value increases and
that leverage goes down as more and more bargaining power is distributed to the equity holders. But
at the ﬁxed-point solution the gain to leverage in each iteration, R, which is what the debt holders and
equity holders do negotiate about, is zero. So in that sense it should not matter how the bargaining
power is distributed between debt and equity holders. The reason why it does matter can only be the
inﬂuence from the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values of debt and equity for n small.
In ﬁgure 8 we study the eﬀect of changing the EBIT volatility, σ. The equity value increases, leverage
and TAD go down, and the yield spread increases as the volatility increases. From ﬁgure 8(b) it can be
seen that the model with renegotiations of debt has the usual asset substitution incentive for the equity
holders. That is, after the debt has been issued the equity holders have incentive to try to increase the
23Mella-Barral (1999) considers a diﬀerent model where it is also optimal for the debt holders to deviate from the absolute
priority rule by oﬀering the equity holders a small share of the proceeds at liquidation in order to speed up the liquidation
process. Both models adds aspects to the whole game of chapter 7 versus chapter 11 in the US bankruptcy code. Cf., e.g.,
Weiss (1990), Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), and Morse and Shaw (1988) for empirical studies of US bankruptcy code
chapter 11 versus chapter 7.
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Figure 7. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the way the bargaining power is distributed between the debt
and equity holders, γ, for the iterative model in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%,
r(1− τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, and  = 50%.
volatility of the underlying EBIT process (e.g., by the way they select new projects for the ﬁrm and
retire old projects) since this activity will increase the value of the equity. However, compared to the
usual static model there is a dynamic eﬀect which limits the equity holders incentive to increase the
volatility in the following way: after the debt has been issued the equity holders do take into account
that this activity of increasing the EBIT volatility at the same time decreases the debt value as well as
the whole ﬁrm value in all future debt calls and renegotiations. With the given base case parameters
the advantage for the equity holders to increase the volatility of the EBIT process still remains as the
results show, because this dynamic eﬀect is already capitalized into the current equity price. However,
because of this dynamic eﬀect the incentive is limited (but not eliminated) compared to a static capital
structure model. The reason for this is that increasing the EBIT volatility results (with the given base
case parameters) in a smaller initial total ﬁrm value, which is what is important for the equity holders
in all future restructurings.
In ﬁgure 9 we study the eﬀect of changing the costs of issuing new debt. The boundaries widens so
that the debt is restructured less frequently when the costs increase. The inﬂuence on debt and equity
values, leverage and yield spreads are fairly small even though TAD decreases from 20% to 10%.
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Figure 8. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the EBIT volatility, σ, for the iterative model in the base case:
µˆ = 2%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, γ = 50%,
and  = 50%.
In ﬁgure 10 we study the eﬀect of changing the bankruptcy costs factor. Since the ﬁrm actually never
go bankrupt—it is just a far out in the future threat that when all the n renegotiation options have
been exercised then eventually the ﬁrm will go bankrupt—it should have a very limited inﬂuence on the
equilibrium results. Indeed the results in ﬁgure 10 substantiate this claim.
In ﬁgure 11 we study the eﬀect of changing the possibilities for tax refunds when EBT is negative,
. It is not surprising that total ﬁrm value increases and that leverage increases as the possibilities for
tax refunds increases. However, we were surprised by the magnitude of the change. Note also that both
TAD and the yield spread increases dramatically as the possibilities for tax refunds increases. Especially
ﬁgure 11(a) tells us that the standard assumption in the literature, cf., e.g., the models of Kane, Marcus,
and McDonald (1985), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a), Leland (1994), and Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland (2001), of full tax refunds when EBT is negative (the case with  = 1) is highly unrealistic in
the sense that the optimal initial coupon rate is set so high that the ﬁrm will always have negative EBT
since c∗ > ξ¯. Actually, this is the case as soon as  is higher than .93. In a model with no renegotiations
this eﬀect is not nearly as dramatic as can be seen by comparing with ﬁgure 2.
Finally, in ﬁgure 12 we study the eﬀect of changing the risk neutral drift of the EBIT process, µˆ.
It is not surprising that the total ﬁrm value increases as the risk neutral drift approaches the after-tax
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Figure 9. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the costs of restructuring (issuing costs of new debt) factor, k,
for the iterative model in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1− τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%,
τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, γ = 50%, and  = 50%.
riskless interest rate. This is the usual Microsoft/dot-com stories. These ﬁrms have dramatically high
price-earnings ratio. Therefore, for high growth ﬁrms a small change in expected earnings has a dramatic
eﬀect on the ﬁrm value and therefore also on the equity value. However, notice how the optimal capital
structure contains less and less debt as the risk neutral drift approaches the after-tax riskless interest
rate. This happens because of the limited tax refunds when EBT is negative. If we allow for full tax
refunds when EBT is negative, i.e.  = 100%, our numerical results show that with µˆ = 4% and all other
parameters as in the base case then the optimal leverage is around 60% and that the TAD shoots up to
above 75% while the optimal coupon rate exceeds ten times the current earnings. Hence, the reduction
of the leverage is purely tax driven: even thought the ﬁrm’s EBIT has great potential it is not optimal
(because of the limited tax refunds) to take on more debt than such that the current earnings can cover
the coupon rates. Given this observation it is clear that the yield spread go down since the debt value is
not increasing with the ﬁrm value as the risk neutral drift approaches the after-tax riskless interest rate.
De facto the debt becomes more or less riskless as the leverage decrease. Hence, our model predicts that
ﬁrms with low growth expectations (e.g., utility based ﬁrms) will have high optimal leverage and fairly
high yield spreads whereas ﬁrms with high growth expectations will have very low optimal leverage and
also very low yield spreads.
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Figure 10. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the bankruptcy costs factor, α, for the iterative model in the
base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%, k = 3%,
γ = 50%, and  = 50%.
8. The Risk Neutral Drift of the EBIT Process
In section 2 when we started modeling the EBIT process our starting point was an exogenously given
drift, µˆ, of the EBIT process under the pricing measure, Q. It is an interesting empirical question how
this drift can be estimated. As we saw in section 7 one of the implications of our model is that the
optimal leverage, the optimal coupon rate, the yield spread, etc. are highly dependent on the value of µˆ,
cf. ﬁgure 12. Therefore, ﬁgure 12 gives us more or less the answer to the question of how to determine µˆ:
from simultaneous observations of the equity value (right after the debt has been issued) and the value
of the EBIT process a unique value for the risk neutral drift of the EBIT process, µˆ, can be backed out.
That is, for a given µˆ, we can go through the whole derivation in sections 2–6 of the iterative model to
ﬁnd the value function of equity, E(·; 1) as function of ξ. Hence, we can deﬁne the function, PE(·), which
gives the price earnings ratio (PE ratio) of the ﬁrm as function of µˆ
PE(µˆ) =
E(ξ; ξ)
ξ
= E.
This function is well-deﬁned because the equity value is homogeneous of degree one jointly in the two
variables, cf. equation (3). Moreover, ﬁgure 12 indicates that PE is an increasing function of µˆ. This
implies that PE has an inverse. Hence, given that we can observe the ﬁrm’s initial PE ratio, µˆ can be
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Figure 11. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the fractional reduction, , of the tax rate when EBT is negative
for the iterative model in the base case: µˆ = 2%, σ = 25%, r(1− τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%,
τe = 50%, λ = 5%, α = 25%, k = 3%, and γ = 50%.
determined. This answer to the question of how to determine µˆ is similar in spirit of how to back out
the (implicit) volatility of the underlying security if one has simultaneous observations of the prices of an
option and the underlying security in a Black-Scholes model, and hence, we term this the implicit risk
neutral drift of the EBIT process. This argument, however, requires that the volatility, σ, of the EBIT
process is already known. If both µˆ and σ are unknown, then we need simultaneous observations of both
the value of the EBIT process, the value of equity, and the value of debt right after the debt has been
issued. (Uniqueness of the solution in this case is yet unsolved.)
Another solution to the problem of how to ﬁnd µˆ is to determine it in equilibrium. Apparently, this
is what Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) claim to do. However, we are not able to get to the
same conclusion by following their arguments. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) start by specifying
exogenously the value process, A, of the unlevered ﬁrm including the value of their leverage potential
but excluding the costs of obtaining the leverage. Moreover, they assume that this value process is a
geometric Brownian motion of the form
(25) dAt = Atµˆdt + AtσdWt
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Figure 12. Upper and lower restructuring boundaries, initial (when ξ = 1) debt and
equity values, initial leverage, initial optimal coupon rates, and initial optimal yield
spreads as a function of the risk neutral drift of the EBIT process, µˆ, for the iterative
model in the base case: σ = 25%, r(1 − τi) = 4.5%, τi = 35%, τe = 50%, λ = 5%,
α = 25%, k = 3%, γ = 50%, and  = 50%.
under an exogenously given and unique pricing measure, denoted Q. That is , they assume that there
exists traded securities such that any new claim that we may want to introduce can be dynamically
replicated by already existing traded securities and therefore priced.24 This is the same arguments as we
used in section 2. With A as the governing state variable, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) derive,
using the same method as we have used in sections 2–3 (with ξ as the governing state variable), the
value of debt and equity as functions of the current value of the unlevered ﬁrm process. Fischer, Heinkel,
and Zechner (1989a) does not include renegotiations of the debt in their model, they only work with
liquidations at the lower boundary (similar to what Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) do in their model
and what we do in sections 2–3).
Given the dynamics of A as speciﬁed in equation (25) and the assumption that A at the same time
represents the price at which one should be able to acquire the ﬁrm before paying the costs of optimally
lever the ﬁrm, we get the following requirement
(26) At = E(At;At) + (1− k)D(At;At),
24Note that the value, A, of the unlevered ﬁrm is not, in general, one of the traded securities and can therefore not be
used in the dynamically replicating argument to price new (derivative) securities which are functions of the value of the
unlevered ﬁrm.
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where the notation is adapted from section 2. That is, the value of the unlevered ﬁrm must at all times
be the value of the debt and equity of the (newly) optimally levered ﬁrm less the costs of obtaining the
optimal leverage. By homogeneity, equation (26) can be reduced to
(27) 1 = E + (1− k)D,
which Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) call a no-arbitrage condition on their model. They use this
equation to determine the risk neutral drift, µˆ, of the unlevered ﬁrm value process. In that they claim
(and we have no reason to doubt this claim as it will become clear soon) that there is only one µˆ which
fulﬁlls equation (27).
Comparing the Fischer-Heinkel-Zechner model to the EBIT based model we have developed in sec-
tions 2–3 we have also deﬁned the value process A as
At = E(ξt; ξt) + (1− k)D(ξt; ξt) = κξt.
That is, there exists a constant, κ, such that25
At = κξt.
Hence, if the unlevered ﬁrm value process, A, is a geometric Brownian motion so is the EBIT process,
ξ, and vice versa. Moreover, the risk neutral drift, µˆ, (and the volatility, σ) of the unlevered ﬁrm value
process, A, and the EBIT process, ξ, are the same.
So how is it possible that in the EBIT based model developed in sections 2–3 there are no restrictions
on µˆ whereas in the unlevered ﬁrm value based model of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989a) µˆ is
uniquely determined? The answer is simple: In the development of the unlevered ﬁrm value based model,
the after-tax payout rates on debt and equity, cf. table 2 in Appendix A, has to be speciﬁed as linear
functions of (A,C) instead of (ξ, C). That is, in the unlevered ﬁrm value based model the payout rate to,
say, equity must be speciﬁed as δAA+ bAC whereas in the EBIT based model it is speciﬁed as δξξ + bξC.
δξ and bξ can be found in table 2 in Appendix A. In order to make the two models equivalent, we must
specify the same payout rate for the unlevered ﬁrm value based model as for the EBIT based model.
Thus, we must have δAA + bAC = δξξ + bξC, for all C and all A and ξ such that A = κξ. This imply
that bA = bξ and
δA = δξ
1
κ
.
Hence, the ratio, κ, between A and ξ must be speciﬁed exogenously before we can specify the payout rate
of equity in order to make the unlevered ﬁrm value based model equivalent to the EBIT based model.
But from the ratio, κ, µˆ can be backed out implicitly by the same argument as with the PE ratio. Hence,
specifying κ exogenously is the same as specifying µˆ exogenously. This is the reason why there is only
one µˆ in the unlevered ﬁrm value based model which is consistent, i.e. which fulﬁlls equation (27).
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) also uses an endogenous drift, µˆ, which they claim depend on the
coupon rate when the tax advantage to debt is measured. To illustrate how µˆ can depend on the debt
issued consider the following example from Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001, p. 495). Suppose that the
current level of EBIT is ξ0 = 100 and that the PE ratio is 20. Then the total value of all future earnings
is V0 = 100 × 20 = 2000. Furthermore, let the corporate tax rate be τc = .35. Thus the corporate tax
payout rate is τc(ξ − C) = 0.35(100− C), for a given coupon rate C. Suppose that the ﬁrm pays out 35
25Actually, κ = E(1, 1) + (1− k)D(1, 1) = E + (1− k)D. In section 2 we called the constant κ for A, but for this section it
will be too confusing to have both A as a geometric Brownian motion and also a scaling constant.
32 PETER OVE CHRISTENSEN, CHRISTIAN RIIS FLOR, DAVID LANDO, AND KRISTIAN R. MILTERSEN
as a dividend rate to the equity holders. This implies that the total payout from the ﬁrm is
total initial payout rate = interest + corporate tax + equity dividend
= C + .35(100− C) + 35 = 70 + .65C,
thus,
(28) V0
(
(1− τi)r − µˆ
)
= ξ0 = 70 + .65C.
Hence, from equation (28) we can back out µˆ as a function of the coupon rate, C. However, in our
opinion, there is a problem in equation (28). First it is assumed that ξ0 = 100 but in equation (28) one
gets ξ0 = 70+ .65C. The missing 30− .65C stems from the assumption that the ﬁrm pays the amount 35
in dividend to the equity holders. Hence, there is remaining free cash in the ﬁrm. The dividend policy is
not irrelevant in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), as well as in our model, the dividend paid out to the
equity holders is residually determined as all of the remaining cash in the ﬁrm. Otherwise one needs to
specify how the remaining free cash ﬂow is used (investments or disinvestments in the EBIT generating
process) and take that into consideration, as well as how dividends aﬀects the process for EBIT, in the
initial optimization problem.
9. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a dynamic capital structure model which includes debt renegotiations
when the bankruptcy threat becomes imminent. We have extended the Goldstein-Ju-Leland model in
two ways: (i) instead of liquidating the ﬁrm and thereby deﬁnitively losing the tax shield, we assume
that the ﬁrm is acquired as a going concern by another entrepreneur in case of bankruptcy. Moreover,
(ii) we allow for voluntary debt renegotiations. These two extensions both work in the same direction.
In our base case example the tax advantage to debt in the Goldstein-Ju-Leland model is around 8% and
a leverage is around 35%. (i) extends the tax advantage to debt to 10%, and (ii) extends it further up to
15%. At the same time leverage is increased by (i) to 40% and by (ii) further up to around 50%. This
ﬁgure for leverage is similar to the ﬁgure for a static capital structure model with the same parameter
values. The point where the equity holders make their take-it-or-leave-it restructuring oﬀer to the debt
holders is determined by standard smooth pasting conditions such that the usual incentive compatibility
constraints for the equity holders are fulﬁlled. In the base case example the equity holders get around
13% of the ﬁrm value, whereas the old debt holders get the rest. In extreme cases (for µˆ = 4%) the
equity holders can get as much as 60% of the value. In both cases the debt holders get less than their
full principal back. Even though this looks like an ex post violation of the absolute priority rule, the
debt holders are still better oﬀ by accepting this restructuring oﬀer from the equity holders than by
rejecting it. The reason is that if they reject the oﬀer, the equity holders would continue to pay the
existing coupon rate for some time before eventually withholding the coupons when the earnings of the
ﬁrm are even lower. This alternative has a lower value to the debt holders than the value of accepting
the restructuring proposal right away.
The numerically demanding part of our analysis is to calculate the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path values
of debt and equity. It turns out that these values are very important in order to understand how the
equity holders should optimally time their take-it-or-leave-it restructuring oﬀer. Moreover, these values
endogenously determine how to split the ﬁrm value between the existing debt and equity holders. At the
ﬁxed-point solution the exogenously given bargaining power distribution, γ, only plays a minor role in the
sense that the gain to restructuring, R, is zero in each iteration. Hence, there is no gain to exogenously
distribute. The ﬁrm value split is fully determined by the endogenously given oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path
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values. To emphasize this point we will go through the following simple example: suppose we assume that
the ﬁrm value split (η) is exogenously given in what we could call a reduced form model (a model of the
type described in section 4). If we set the ﬁrm value split in the reduced form model equal to the ﬁrm value
split our iterative model determined endogenously, we do not get the same lower and upper boundaries as
optimal for the reduced form model as we do for our iterative model.26 The reason is that in the iterative
model the split is not a ﬁxed number, η. The iterative model takes into account that if the equity holders
want the debt holders to accept their restructuring proposal for another (oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path) value
of d, they might very well have to oﬀer them a bigger share of the value.
Our results indicate that empirically we should observe huge variations in leverage between the dates
when ﬁrms realign their capital structure either by renegotiating their debt terms or by issuing new
securities. Even for fairly small transactions costs as in our examples the earnings of the ﬁrm should have
changed by a factor 2.5 before it is optimal for the ﬁrm to realign its capital structure. In the mean time
between realignment dates the ﬂuctuations in earnings result in ﬂuctuations in debt and equity values
that makes the leverage vary from around 21% to 87% in our base case example. Moreover, for the same
reasons the object function of the ﬁrm is very ﬂat over a large area, so even though our model can ﬁnd
a unique optimal capital structure for the ﬁrm, it is not that important for the total ﬁrm value that the
ﬁrm targets it capital structure at that exact level. Furthermore, other issues outside our model even of
small magnitude could change the optimum quite a bit because of the fairly ﬂat objective function.
One of the things our model cannot explain is why some ﬁrms end up continuing operation after a debt
restructuring while others end up being liquidated. In our model the ﬁrm is always more valuable alive
than liquidated and, hence, it is natural that it should never be liquidated. We see two ways that the
model can be extended to include this feature. Either we can introduce an exogenously given probability
that the debt and equity holders cannot reach an agreement of how to restructure the ﬁrm, or we can
introduce a second state variable measuring the value of the ﬁrm’s assets. In this last model the ﬁrm
can be liquidated simply because the ﬁrm’s assets are more valuable than the present value of the EBIT
process optimally levered. This can, e.g., be the case if the assets can be used for some other purpose
than generating the current EBIT. A ﬁrst attempt in this direction is Flor (2002).
Our model cannot capture strategic debt service of the type where it is simply the current coupon rate
which is reduced, whereas the capital structure stays ﬁxed as it is modeled in Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). However, it is fairly easy to extend our model to incor-
porate both types of debt renegotiations simply by introducing an extra boundary condition above d but
below one, say s. As long as ξ ∈ (sξ0, uξ0), the debt is serviced with the full coupon rate, c∗ξ0, but when
ξ ∈ (dξ0, sξ0] the debt is only serviced according to the strategic debt service models. Finally, when ξ
eventually hits either dξ0 or uξ0, the ﬁrm’s capital structure is re-optimized and the game starts all over
again.
Finally, our model does not include investment decisions. The EBIT process is exogenously given. It
is not possible within the model to retain some of the earnings to increase the scale of the EBIT process
or to increase the dividend payments by decreasing the scale of the EBIT process. As the model is, all
earnings must be paid out to debt holders, equity holders, and the tax authorities.
26For the base case parameters the values are very close but not identical. But for more extreme parameter values the
diﬀerences can be substantial. For example, for µˆ = 4% the optimal d and u are .30 and 4.28 for the iterative model,
whereas for the reduced form model with the same split (60% of the ﬁrm value goes to the equity holders) the optimal d
and u are .18 and 3.71.
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Appendix A. Fixed Point Solution to the Pricing of Debt and Equity
To set up some notation, we quickly reiterate parts of the standard theory. First, consider a very simple
claim paying one unit of account when ξ hits the lower boundary,
¯
ξ, but only if the lower boundary has
been hit before the upper boundary, ξ¯. The price, denoted
¯
P , of this claim as a function of the current
level of EBIT, ξ, can be derived as
¯
P (ξ) =
−ξ¯x2ξx1 + ξ¯x1ξx2
Σ
, ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯],
where
x1 =
( 12σ
2 − µˆ) +
√
(µˆ− 12σ2)2 + 2(1− τi)rσ2
σ2
,
x2 =
( 12σ
2 − µˆ)−
√
(µˆ− 12σ2)2 + 2(1− τi)rσ2
σ2
,
and
Σ = ξ¯x1
¯
ξx2 −
¯
ξx1 ξ¯x2 .
This follows from the fact that
¯
P solves the linear ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE)
(29)
1
2
σ2ξ2
¯
P ′′(ξ) + µˆξ
¯
P ′(ξ)− (1− τi)r¯P (ξ) = 0,
with the boundary conditions
¯
P (
¯
ξ) = 1 and
¯
P (ξ¯) = 0.
Similarly, interchanging the boundary conditions, we ﬁnd the price of a claim paying one unit of account
when ξ hits the upper boundary, ξ¯, but only if the upper boundary has been hit before the lower boundary,
¯
ξ. The price, denoted P¯ , of this claim as a function of the current level of EBIT, ξ, can be derived as
P¯ (ξ) = ¯
ξx2ξx1 −
¯
ξx1ξx2
Σ
, ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯].
We also need a claim that pays a dividend stream at the rate δξs + b at any date s ∈ [t,∞). The date t
value of this claim can easily be derived (either using risk neutral expectations or Gordon’s formula) as
∆ξt + B,
where
∆ =
δ
(1− τi)r − µˆ and B =
b
(1− τi)r .
With these three claims priced we are able to price all claims of interest in our model. Consider the
claim which pays oﬀ a dividend stream at the rate δξt + b at any date, t, until one of the boundaries
has been hit. When it hits one of the boundaries, it pays out a ﬁnal lump-sum payment. If the lower
boundary,
¯
ξ, has been hit ﬁrst, it pays out
¯
F , and if the upper boundary, ξ¯, has been hit ﬁrst, it pays
out F¯ . The price, denoted F (·; δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F, ξ¯, F¯ ), of this claim as a function of the current level of EBIT, ξ,
can easily be derived as
(30) F (ξ; δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F, ξ¯, F¯ ) = ∆ξ + B + (
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ −B)
¯
P (ξ) + (F¯ −∆ξ¯ −B)P¯ (ξ), ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯].
Equation (30) has the following easy interpretation: The date t value of getting the dividend stream at
the rate δξs + b at any date s ∈ [t,∞) is ∆ξt + B. Eventually ξ will hit either
¯
ξ or ξ¯. If, e.g.,
¯
ξ has been
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hit ﬁrst, the claim pays out
¯
F and the rest of the dividend stream (with a value of ∆
¯
ξ + B) is forgone.
The net present value of this back at date t is (
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ − B)
¯
P (ξt). The same argument applies for the
upper boundary, ξ¯.
Plugging in the deﬁnitions of
¯
P and P¯ reveals27
F (ξ; δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F, ξ¯, F¯ ) =
1
Σ
(
(F¯ −∆ξ¯ −B)
¯
ξx2 − (
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ −B)ξ¯x2)ξx1
+
1
Σ
(
(
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ −B)ξ¯x1 − (F¯ −∆ξ¯ −B)
¯
ξx1
)
ξx2 + ∆ξ + B, ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯].
(33)
A very useful property of the price function, F , is the following positive homogeneity of degree one
property
(34) F (λξ; δ, λb, λ
¯
ξ, λ
¯
F, λξ¯, λF¯ ) = λF (ξ; δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F, ξ¯, F¯ ),
for any ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯] and λ ∈ R+. This is very easily checked by directly applying equation (33).28
The economic intuition behind this homogeneity property is quite trivial: if the unit of account was
changed, e.g., from $ to  , on all inputs, then also the value will change accordingly from being measured
in $ to being measured in  . This result heavily relies on the scaling invariant feature of the geometric
Brownian motion and that everything except for monetary units is speciﬁed in rates.
With this machinery in place we return to the problem of ﬁnding the optimal dynamic capital structure
of the ﬁrm and the values of debt and equity. Basically, debt and equity are claims of the form F just
derived. We just have to ﬁnd δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F , ξ¯, and F¯ for both debt and equity.
In order to ﬁnd the after-tax payout rate, δξ + b, on debt and equity we need to know the tax rules.
Coupon payments paid out to the debt holders are expenses for the ﬁrm, i.e. they are subtracted from the
EBIT (giving earnings before taxes, EBT) before the ﬁrm pays corporate tax. Hence, the total tax paid
on coupons is the personal interest tax paid by the debt holders. For dividends the ﬁrm must ﬁrst pay
tax on its EBT before dividends can be paid out to the equity holders. On top of that the equity holders
pay dividend tax on dividends paid out. Hence, the after-tax payout rate, δξ + b, on debt is speciﬁed as
δξ + b = (1− τi)C
27Alternatively, equation (33) can be derived by observing that F is the solution to the inhomogeneous ODE (suppressing
δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F , ξ¯, and F¯ in the notation for F )
(31)
1
2
σ2ξ2F ′′(ξ) + µˆξF ′(ξ)− (1− τi)rF (ξ) + δξ + b = 0,
with the boundary conditions
F (
¯
ξ) =
¯
F and F (ξ¯) = F¯.
Recall that the general solution to the ODE (31) is
(32) F (ξ; δ, b,
¯
ξ,
¯
F, ξ¯, F¯ ) = k1ξ
x1 + k2ξ
x2 +
δξ
(1− τi)r − µˆ
+
b
(1− τi)r
, ξ ∈ [
¯
ξ, ξ¯],
where k1 and k2 are determined by the boundary conditions. Simple manipulations reveal that
k1 =
1
Σ
(
(F¯ −∆ξ¯ −B)
¯
ξx2 − (
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ −B)ξ¯x2)
and
k2 =
1
Σ
(
(
¯
F −∆
¯
ξ −B)ξ¯x1 − (F¯ −∆ξ¯ −B)
¯
ξx1
)
.
28That it is true for any ξ ∈ (
¯
ξ, ξ¯) follows directly. That it is also true for ξ ∈ {
¯
ξ, ξ¯} must be checked separately. It comes
from the fact that F (
¯
ξ) =
¯
F and F (ξ¯) = F¯ . The reason why, e.g., F (ξ¯) = F¯ is because if ξ = ξ¯ then the upper boundary is
hit immediately and therefore (i) there is no waiting time until one of the two boundaries will be hit and (ii) there is zero
probability that the lower boundary will be hit before the upper boundary.
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δ b
D 0 (1− τi)C
Eξ≥C 1− τe −(1− τe)C
Eξ<C 1− τe −(1− τe)C
D + Eξ≥C 1− τe (τe − τi)C
D + Eξ<C 1− τe (τe − τi)C
Table 2. Values for δ and b for debt (D) and equity (E) both when EBT is positive
and when it is negative.
and for equity it is speciﬁed as
δξ + b =


(1− τe)(ξ − C), if ξ ≥ C,
(1− τe)(ξ − C), if ξ < C.
Here τe denotes the eﬀective tax rate on dividends. That is,
τe = τc + (1− τc)τd,
where τc denotes the corporate tax rate, and τd denotes the personal dividend tax rate.  denotes the
fraction that the eﬀective tax rate is reduced to when earnings after interest payments, ξ−C, are negative,
cf. footnote 7. The values assigned to δ and b for debt and equity are summarized in table 2. By adding
the payout rates of debt and equity we see that there is a tax advantage to debt if and only if the eﬀective
tax rate on dividends is higher than the personal tax on interest payments, i.e. τe > τi, when EBT is
positive, i.e. ξ ≥ C. However, for ξ < C it is possible that there can be a tax disadvantage to debt.
This happens when τe < τi. For the rest of the paper we assume that τe > τi such that there is a
tax advantage to debt for positive EBT. This implies that the optimal capital structure of the ﬁrm will
include some debt.
For a given (optimal) coupon rate, C∗, on the debt, and a given restructuring policy, (
¯
ξ, ξ¯) (determined
endogenously in the model when the debt was issued, e.g. at date zero when the EBIT process was
ξ0), we must specify the value of debt and equity when one of the restructuring boundaries has been
hit. However, contrary to a static capital structure model these values are not known since when the
restructuring boundaries have been hit, the (possible new) owner will again issue debt and equity and
continue operation. To establish some notation we denote these values (the notation is obvious) as
¯
D, D¯,
¯
E, and E¯. Furthermore, denote the earliest date after the debt issue when a restructuring boundary has
been hit as τ . Since the situation at date τ , when the (possible new) owner of the whole ﬁrm reissues new
debt, is exactly identical to the situation at date zero when the original entrepreneur issued the original
debt—except that the EBIT process is now ξτ instead of ξ0—we conjecture that the coupon rate of the
newly issued debt will be ξτξ0 C
∗ at date τ , the new restructuring policy will be ( ξτξ0¯
ξ, ξτξ0 ξ¯), and the new
boundary values will be ξτξ0 ¯
D, ξτξ0 D¯,
ξτ
ξ0 ¯
E, and ξτξ0 E¯. In fact, we will later prove that this conjecture is
correct.
To be formal,
Conjecture A.1. (1) The optimal coupon rate C∗ determined just prior to issuing the debt at a
given date s when the EBIT process is ξs can be written as
C∗ = c∗ξs,
for a given constant c∗.
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(2) The incentive compatible restructuring policy (
¯
ξ, ξ¯), which is common knowledge as soon as the
coupon rate C∗ is fixed at a given date s when the EBIT process is ξs, can be written as
¯
ξ = dξs
and
ξ¯ = uξs,
for given constants d ∈ (0, 1) and u ∈ (1,∞).
(3) The values of debt and equity when one of the boundaries (induced by the commonly known
restructuring policy fixed by the optimally determined coupon rate at a given date s when the
EBIT process is ξs) has been hit can be written as
¯
D =
¯
dξs,
D¯ = d¯ξs,
¯
E =
¯
eξs,
and
E¯ = e¯ξs,
for given constants
¯
d, d¯,
¯
e, and e¯.
Given Conjecture A.1 we can derive (and denote) the price at any given date t when the EBIT process
is ξt of debt and equity issued at some date s ≤ t when the EBIT process was ξs, provided that the EBIT
process {ξu}u∈[s,t] in the time period [s, t) has stayed inside the interval (dξs, uξs) as
D(ξt; ξs) = F (ξt; 0, (1− τi)c∗ξs, dξs,¯dξs, uξs, d¯ξs)
and
E(ξt; ξs) = F (ξt; 1− τe,−(1− τe)c∗ξs, dξs,¯eξs, uξs, e¯ξs).(35)
To be exact, the equity value, E, has only the form (35) if c∗ ≤ d. This is due to the asymmetric tax
regime the equity holders face. They have to pay at the tax rate τe when the ﬁrm’s earnings (net of
coupon payments) are positive, but they can only deduct at the tax rate τe when the ﬁrm’s earnings (net
of coupon payments) are negative. Hence, if c∗ ∈ (d, u), then the equity value has to be pieced together
in the following way so that it is one-time continuously diﬀerentiable
(36) E(ξt; ξs) =


F (ξt; 1− τe,−(1− τe)c∗ξs, dξs,¯eξs, c
∗ξs, e∗ξs), if ξt < c∗ξs,
F (ξt; 1− τe,−(1− τe)c∗ξs, c∗ξs, e∗ξs, uξs, e¯ξs), if ξt ≥ c∗ξs.
Here, e∗ is the equity value when ξt = c∗ and ξs = 1. This value is determined by requiring the equity
value function, E, to be continuously diﬀerentiable in the ﬁrst variable at the point ξt = c∗ξs.29 Finally,
29Formally, we have to add the condition that the equity value at the point where the two parts are pieced together in a
one-time continuously diﬀerentiable way can be written as e∗ξs to our Conjecture A.1. That is, we have to add to part 3
of Conjecture A.1 that the value of equity, at the point where ξt = c∗ξs, can be written as
E(c∗ξs; ξs) = e∗ξs
for a given constant e∗.
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if c∗ ≥ u, the ﬁrm always has negative earnings net of coupon payments, so E has the form
E(ξt; ξs) = F (ξt; 1− τe,−(1− τe)c∗ξs, dξs,¯eξs, uξs, e¯ξs).
Appendix B. Verification of Conjecture A.1
In this appendix we verify that there exists solutions to debt and equity that fulﬁlls Conjecture A.1.
Equations (5), (6), (8), and (9) immediately verify part 3 of Conjecture A.1 and that
¯
d = min
{
(1− α)Ad,D},
d¯ = (1 + λ)D,
¯
e = max
{
(1− α)Ad−D, 0},
and
e¯ = Au− (1 + λ)D.
For given c∗, d, and u, the two constants D and E can be found by solving for the initial debt and equity
values for ξt = ξs = 1. That is, using the expression of F from equation (30) we have the following two
equations in two unknowns30
D = ∆D
(
1− d
¯
P (1)− uP¯ (1))+ BD(1− ¯P (1)− P¯ (1)
)
+ min
{
(1− α)Ad,D}
¯
P (1) + (1 + λ)DP¯ (1)
and
E = ∆E
(
1− d
¯
P (1)− uP¯ (1))+ BE(1− ¯P (1)− P¯ (1)
)
+ max
{
(1− α)Ad−D, 0}
¯
P (1) +
(
Au− (1 + λ)D)P¯ (1).
Here,
∆D = 0, ∆E =
(1− τe)
(1− τi)r − µˆ , BD =
c∗
r
, and BE =
−(1− τe)c∗
(1− τi)r .
For a given c∗, we can ﬁnd d and u by the two smooth pasting conditions, equations (7) and (10).
Unfortunately, these two equations in two unknowns can only be solved numerically. However, by Euler’s
theorem E1 is positive homogeneous of degree zero because E itself is positive homogeneous of degree
one, cf. equation (3). That is,
E1(λξt;λξs) = E1(ξt; ξs),
for any ξt ∈ [dξs, uξs] and λ ∈ R+. Hence, equations (7) and (10) are identical independent of the actual
level of ξ0. Therefore, the solutions d and u are also independent of the actual level of ξ0. That is, we
have veriﬁed part 2 of Conjecture A.1.31
Finally, the optimal coupon rate of the debt, which is determined just prior to the debt issue at date
zero, is given by
C∗ = argmax
C∈R+
A(ξ0).
30If c∗ ∈ (d, u), there are three unknowns: D, E, and e∗. The third equation comes from diﬀerentiability of the equity
function, E, at ξt = c∗ξs, cf. equation (36).
31In fact, this positive homogeneity property of degree zero of E1 can also be used to verify that e∗ is independent of the
actual level of ξ0. This veriﬁes the missing conjecture in the case where c∗ ∈ (d, u), cf. footnote 29.
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That is so because it is the original entrepreneur who determines the coupon rate of the perpetual debt
that he or she would like to issue. Naturally, the entrepreneur sets the coupon rate in order to maximize
his or her own value. Moreover, rewriting C as cξ0 gives exactly the same optimization problem since ξ0
is positive
C∗ = argmax
C∈R+
A(ξ0) = ξ0
(
argmax
c∈R+
A(ξ0)
ξ0
)
.
Plugging in the deﬁnition of A(ξ0) from equation (4) gives
c∗ = argmax
c∈R+
E(ξ0; ξ0) + (1− k)D(ξ0; ξ0)
ξ0
= argmax
c∈R+
(
F (ξ0; 1− τe,−(1− τe)cξ0, d(c)ξ0,¯e(c)ξ0, u(c)ξ0, e¯(c)ξ0)
ξ0
+ (1− k)F (ξ0; 0, (1− τi)cξ0, d(c)ξ0,¯d(c)ξ0, u(c)ξ0, d¯(c)ξ0)
ξ0
)
= argmax
c∈R+
(
F (1; 1− τe,−(1− τe)c, d(c),¯e(c), u(c), e¯(c))
+ (1− k)F (1; 0, (1− τi)c, d(c),¯d(c), u(c), d¯(c))
)
.
Note that we have emphasized the dependence of d, u,
¯
d, d¯,
¯
e, and e¯ on the given coupon rate parameter,
c, cf. part 2 and 3 of Conjecture A.1. Finally, notice that the optimal coupon rate parameter, c∗, in
the above optimization is independent of the initial level ξ0 so we have veriﬁed the last part (part 1) in
Conjecture A.1. That is, we have now veriﬁed that there exists a ﬁxed-point solution to our debt and
equity valuation problem giving us solutions to the value of debt and equity fulﬁlling Conjecture A.1.
Because of our conjecture-veriﬁcation method of ﬁnding the ﬁxed-point solution, we cannot rule out that
there might be other ﬁxed-point solutions which do not fulﬁll Conjecture A.1.
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